ड Ms-149,1r
it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn't I say he was mistaken? “Why should I say this & not rather, he has forgot the meanings of his words.
But after all only I can lastly decide whether what he said, is right. “We can't assume that he knows what I see & I don't !” We can absolutely do this!
Can a man doubt whether what he sees is red or green? [Elaborate this]
“Surely if he sees | knows anything he must know that he sees!”— It is true that the game of “showing or telling what one sees” is one of the most fundamental language games, which means that what we in ordinary life call using language mostly presupposes this game.
I can for what I see use the impersonal form of description & the fact that I say “for what I see” doesn't say at all that after all this is only a disguised personal description! For I just expressed myself in English.|For I just expressed myself in our ordinary form of expression.
ड Ms-149,1v
Ist ein Würfel ein äußerst regelmäßiger symmetrischer Körper, oder das Unregelmäßige was ich sehe, wenn ich ihn vor einer Ecke aus sehe? Was soll ich hervorheben? Soll ich sagen er sei primär unregelmäßig aber man könne ihn als etwas Regelmäßiges unregelmäßig projiziert darstellen, oder er sei primär regelmäßig sei aber unregelmäßig projiziert gesehen?
149001
What's the difference between me being angry and him being angry?
If I wish to write down my experiences the two experiences that I am angry & that he is angry are absolutely entirely different (although the words used to describe them are very similar.) I might therefore naturally object to this way of expression.
ड Ms-149,2r
“Ein Würfel hat 9 reelle Kanten & 3 imaginäre.”
If I write down my own experiences nothing is more natural than to refer to ‘I’ only to my body|or Ludwig Wittgenstein's body as opposed to other bodies, but not to … distinguish my toothache from his by the words I & he.
The usual game played with the word ‘toothache’ involves the distinction of bodies which have the toothache.
Does the solipsist also say that only he can play chess?
But he will say that behind the sentence ‘I see …’ when he says it & it's true there stands something which does not stand behind “he sees” or ‘I see’ when the other man says it .
I'll start with a description of what ‘I see’ but in impersonal form.
‘Ich spreche’ & ‘der Andere spricht’ sind zwei
ड Ms-149,2v
total verschiedene Erfahrungen.
Ich sage “Es ist schön”, dann sage ich “das habe ich gesprochen”. Damit habe ich weder mir noch dem Andern gesagt wer es gesprochen hat. Ich habe einen gezeigt.
“Aber woher weiß ich daß ich gesprochen haben wenn nicht aus der eigentümlichen motorischen Erfahrung des Sprechens.
Das Wort ‘Ich’ bezeichnet keine Person.
Remember that, whatever the word ‘ I’ means to you, to the other man it shows|drives his attention to a human body & is of no value otherwise.
149002
Hat es einen Sinn zu sagen, der Stern bleibt beim gleichen Punkt?
ड Ms-149,3r
I could write say a book on Physics in which every sentence starts with “I remember”.
Could one say :Here the sentences are all directly backed by real experiences or by primary reality.
We must be misled in a queer way!
“Surely”, I want to say, “if I'm to be really quite frank I must say that I have something which nobody has”.— But who's I?— Hell! I don't express myself properly but there's something you can't deny that there is my personal experience & that this in a most important sense has no neighbour.— But you don't mean by that that it happens to be alone but that it…s grammatical position is that of having no neighbour.
“But somehow our language doesn't bring it out, that there is something unique namely real present experience, & do you just wish to advice me to resign myself to that?”
[A philosophical book might be entitled
ड Ms-149,3v
“the wonders of the jungle”.]
(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel that we have to resign ourselves to something by using ordinary language!)
How is it that the Auszeichnung we | I might propose for those sentences which describe my personal experience does … not really quite satisfy me?
Partly because of what we call “imagining that the other person sees (feels pain etc.)”.
D.h. wir sind geneigt dasselbe Bild für <…> Vorgänge zu verwenden.
Now imagine this: as soon as ever he has learned enough of language to be able to | say so | express it he tells us that he saw blue when he said ‘Is not red’.
This sounds as if then we really ought to be convinced that he saw blue etc.⇄
The person who paints his memories.
⇆
It reminds one misleadingly of :“as soon as ever
ड Ms-149,4r
he had learnt enough of their language the stranger informed his hosts of … ⇒•
Augustin, about expressing he wishes inside him.
Why shouldn't we consider the case that the child learns to think & always dreams. Had it had a private language before it learnt ours?
Only: What do we mean by learning the language? In what sense can we be said to teach the child the natural gesture-language? Or can't we teach him that?
Can't the child learn to wish for an apple by learning to draw an apple?
↔
⇐• This hangs together with the idea that the child remembers before it says it does .
Consider the case of the child drawing|painting its memories.
It has painted a blue light instead of a red one.
ड Ms-149,4v
Kreis & Ellipse. Soll ich sagen :“er hat der Kreis gestern als Ellipse gesehen”, oder so stellt er den folgende Tag einen Kreis dar”.
[Sich daran erinnern das & das gedacht zu haben. “Ich erinnere mich nicht an ihn aber ich weiß|erinnere mich daß er mir einer dümmlich Eindruck gemacht hat”]
“He mostly sees red where we see red”
The normal use of the expression “he sees green where…” is this: We take it as the criterion for meaning the same by ‘red’ as the other people | we do that as a rule he argues with them | us in giving the same names to the colours of objects as they | we do. If then in a particular instant he says something is red when we should say that it's green we say that he sees it differently from us.
Notice how in such a case we would behave. We should look for a cause of his differing judgement & if we had found one we should certainly be inclined to say he saw red when we saw green.
ड Ms-149,5r
It is further clear that even before even finding such a cause we might under circumstances be inclined to say this. But also that we can't give a strict rule for ….
Consider this case: someone says it's green| I can't understand it I see everything green | blue today & vice versa. We answer: it must look queer! He says it does & e.g. goes on to say how cold the glowing coal looks & how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should under these or similar circumstances be inclined to say that he saw red what we saw green. And again we should say that we know that he means by the words blue & red what we do as he has always used them as we did|had.
On the other hand: Someone tells us today that yesterday he always saw everything red, blue and so on. We say: But you called the glowing coal red you know & the sky blue. He answers: That was because I had also
ड Ms-149,5v
changed the names. We say: But didn't it feel very queer & he says: No it seemed all perfectly ordinary|natural. Would we in this case too say: …?
Case of contradictory memory images. tomorrow he remembers this, the day after tomorrow something else.
The whole trend, to show the expression “letting one look through his soul” is often misleading.
Back to the example of the number of afterimages. We can say that these cases are not cases of communications of personal experiences if there were no personal experiences but only ‘the outward signs’?
Now I ask what are our criteria for there being or there having been a personal experience beside the expression? And here the answer seems to be that for the outsider //the other man// the criteria are indeed more outside expressions but that I myself know whether I have an experience or not in particular
ड Ms-149,6r
whether I see red or not.
But let me ask what is knowing that I see red like: I mean: look at something red ‘know that it is red’ & ask|observe| //mark// yourself what you're doing. Don't you mean seeing red & impressing it on your mind that you are doing so? But there are, I suppose, several things that you are doing : You probably say to yourself the word ‘red’ or ‘this is red’ or something of the sort, or perhaps glance from the red object to another red one which you're taking to be the paradigm of red & such like. On the other hand you just intently stare at the red thing.
In many | part of their uses the words | expressions ‘visual image’ & ‘picture’ run parallel but where … they don't the analogy which does exist tends to delude us.
Tautology
The grammar of ‘seeing red’ connected to the expression of seeing red closer than one thinks.
“You talk as though one couldn't|can't see a red patch if one doesn't | can't say
ड Ms-149,6v
that one does; as|As if seeing something was saying that one sees it”.
“Seeing something” of course doesn't mean the same as saying that one sees something but the senses of their expression are closer related than it might appear to you.
We say a blind man doesn't see anything. But not only do we say so but he too says that he does not see I don't mean “he agrees with us that he does not see”, “he does not dispute it”, but rather, he too describes the facts in this way having learnt the same language as we have. Now whom do we call blind, what is our criterion for blindness? A certain kind of behaviour. And if a | the person behaves in that particular way we not only call him blind but teach him to call himself blind. And in this sense his behaviour also determines the meaning of blindness for him. But now you will say: “Surely blindness isn't a behaviour; it's clear that a man can behave like a blind man & not be blind. Therefore ‘blindness’ means something different: this behaviour only helps him
ड Ms-149,7r
to understand what we mean by ‘blindness’. The outward circumstances are what both I we and he know. Whenever he behaves in a certain way we say that he sees nothing & he notices that a certain private experience of his coincides with all these cases & thereby can|so concludes that we mean this experiences of his by saying that he sees nothing….
The idea is that we teach a man | person the meaning of expressions relating to personal experiences indirectly.— Such an indirect mode of teaching we could imagine as follows. … We | I teach a child the names of colours & a game, say, of bringing objects of a certain colour when the ‘name of the colour’ is called out. I don't however teach him the colour-names by pointing to a sample which we & he see saying e.g. the word ‘red’. Instead I have various spectacles each of which when we | I look through it makes us | me see the white paper in a different colour. These spectacles are also distinguished by their
ड Ms-149,7v
outside appearance : the one that makes me see red has round | circular glasses the green | another one elliptical ones etc. We now teach the child in this way that when I see it putting the round | circular ones on his nose I say the word ‘red’, when the elliptical ones ‘ green’ & so forth? This one might call reacting the child the meanings of the colour names in an indirect way because I | one could here|in this case say that I led the child to correlate the word red with something that I didn't see but hoped the child would see if it looked through the circular glasses. And this way is indirect as opposed to the direct way of pointing to a red object etc..
[mind-reading]
From this it should follow that we sometimes rightly sometimes wrongly teach a man to say that he is blind : For what if he saw all the time but nevertheless behaved exactly like a blind man?— Or should we say: “Nature wouldn't play such a trick on us !”.
We can see here that we don't quite
ड Ms-149,8r
understand the real use of the word | expression “to see something” or “to see nothing”. And what is so misleading to us when we consider this use is the following: We say “Surely we can see something without ever saying or showing that we do & on the other hand we can say that we see so & so without seeing it, therefore seeing is the process & expressing that we see another, & all they have to do with each other is that they sometimes coincide; they have the same connection as being red & being sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet “etc.”.
Now this is obviously not quite true & not quite false. It seems we somehow|that we look at the use of these words with some prejudice. It is clear that we in our language use the expression | words ‘seeing red’ in such a way that we can say “he sees …|A sees red, but doesn't show it” on the other hand it is easy to see that we would have no use for these words if their application was severed from the criteria of behaviour, that is to say, to the language game which we play with these words it is, both, essential that the people who play it (should) behave in the particular way we call expressing|saying, showing what
ड Ms-149,8v
they see, & also that they sometimes|under certain circumstances they should more or less or entirely conceal what they see.
Balance: The point of the game depends upon what usually happens.
Point of a game
⇆ How does he know that he sees|has the visual image red i.e. how does he connect the word ‘red’ with ‘ a particular colour’? In fact what does the expression ‘a particular’ here mean. What is the criterion for his connecting it|the word always to the same colour|experience? Is it not often just that he calls it red?
But doesn't then the word “seeing red” mean to me a particular process|certain (private) experience or (mental) <…>|fact in the realm of primary experience , | — which surely is utterly different from saying certain words?⇄
In fact if he is to play a languagegame the possibility of this will depend upon his own & the other people's reactions. The game depends upon the agreement of these reactions i.e. they must call | describe the same things ‘red’.
“But if he speaks to himself surely this is different. For then he needn't consult other people's reactions & he just gives the name ‘red’ to the same colour as that | to which he
ड Ms-149,9r
gave it on a previous occasion.|on previous occasions.|in previous cases. But how does he know that it is the same colour. Does he also recognize the sameness of colour as what he used to call sameness of colour & so on ad infinitum? It is quite true he uses | connects, in agreement with ordinary use, the word ‘red’ & the same colour such that he would not say that he saw how the colour he had seen before that that colour is red but that what he sees now is not red etc.
It is quite true, he connects the word & the experience.
The words “‘seeing red’ means a part experience” are useless unless we can follow them up by: ‘namely this → (pointing)’. Or else they may say experience as opposed to physical object, but then this is grammar.
But I could use language just for making entries in my diary & without even having learnt it I could have invented a name for the particular a colour sensation say the name ‘red’ & then used this name to write down whenever I had that
ड Ms-149,9v
colour sensation. That means, you (would) play a private language game with yourself. But let's see, how are we to describe this game?
When you say “the expression ‘---’ means to you a certain private experience” you are (indeed) supplementing this statement by imagining a red colour, or looking at a red object, (which supply the ‘ namely this’), but how do you use|make use of the expression & the experience you thus connect with it? For what we call the meaning of the word lies in the game we play with it.
But it seems to me that I either see red or don't see red. Whether I say | express it or not.
Picture we use here
This picture not questioned but its application.
Both cases of tautologies.
“Surely seeing is one thing, & showing that I see is another thing”.— This certainly is like saying “skipping is one thing &
ड Ms-149,10r
jumping another”. But there is a supplement to this statement “skipping is this (showing it) & jumping this (showing it)”. Now how about this supplement in the first case? “Seeing red is this (showing it) & showing that we see red, this (showing it)” The point is just that there isn't a ‘showing that I see’ except … showing that I see. “But can't I say: seeing red is what I'm doing now” (looking at something red)? And although in a sense the other man can't directly see what I'm talking about, I certainly know that it is that I'm talking about. That is although for him I can't point directly to the my seeing red, for myself I can point to it, & in this sense I can give an ostensive definition of the expression to myself. ← But an ostensive definition is not a magic act .
If I explain to someone to | the use of --- by. Giving the ostensive definition simply consists in ---.
One might be inclined to say that castling was not just the act of ….
But it is the game of which it is part….
So what does giving to myself the ostensive definition of red consist in? I suppose we should say I suppose looking | —Now how am I to describe it shall I say seeing red &
ड Ms-149,10v
saying to myself that I do. | ‘this is red.’ | ‘or I see red.’— … Or is it “seeing a certain colour sensation & saying ‘I see red’”? The first version it seems doesn't account for that fact|won't do as it isn't essential to us that when I do for myself what I call ‘seeing red’ that should necessarily be what the others understand | mean by seeing red. So I would rather leave it open what colour I am concentrating my attention on. But then how can I call it a colour? Isn't it just as uncertain that I mean by colour what he means as that I mean by red what they mean & the same of course holds for | applies to ‘seeing’ (for what here I mean by the word is not an activity of the human eye). (The second version is justified only if I wish to say that it does not matter here to which of the colours (say, red, green, blue, yellow) he gives | he assigns the name ‘red’ & so we might have said “he sees a same colour, say, blue & says ‘I see red.’”.)
But it's a blatant error to mix up ‘seeing red’ with showing that you see red! I know what seeing red is & I know what showing … is. Couldn't we say that knowing what showing … is, is seeing?
ड Ms-149,11r
Consider the proposition: He makes sure what it means to him by …. Would you say the word had meaning to him if it ‘meant something else’ even time? And what is the criterion of the same colour coming twice. showing now what is knowing what seeing is .
In knowing what seeing red is you seem to give yourself a sample | you say to yourself ‘seeing red is this’ but you don't because the usual criteria for the sameness of the sample don't apply. I can say I call ‘red’ always the same colour or whenever I explain red I point to a sample of the same colour.
If we describe a game which he plays with himself is it relevant that he should use the word red for the same colour in our sense or would we also call it a language game if he used it anyhow. Then what is the criterion for using it in the same way? Not merely the connection between ‘same’, ’colour’ & ‘red’?
Which is the same colour as that I saw? Not the one to which I apply the words ‘this is the same colour ’?
“Let me see if I still know which of these colours is red? — looking about Yes I know.” (Here I could have said “is called red”)
So he can make sure of what it means in this private way‘!|in this private way of what it means by having a private sensation Making sure that you know what ‘seeing
ड Ms-149,11v
red’ means is good only if you can make use of this knowledge in a future case. Now what if I see a colour again, can I say I made sure I knew what ‘red’ was|meant so now I shall know that I'll recognize it correctly? In what sense is having said the words ‘this is red’ before a guarantee that I now see the same colour when I say again I see red?
We can indeed imagine a Robinson using a language for himself but then he must behave in a certain way or we shouldn't say that he plays language games with himself.
The grammar of ‘private sense data’
Das Interessante ist nicht daß ich nicht auf mein Benehmen achten muß um zu wissen, daß ich Zahnschmerzen habe, sondern, daß mir mein Benehmen gar nichts sagt.
ड Ms-149,12r
“I sent him to the doctor because he moans” is just as correct as “I sent him to the doctor because he has toothache”.
“I moan because I have pain”.— Are you sure that that's why you moan?
“But damn all the nucleus of our language remains untouched whatever we might imagine our behaviour to be!” The nucleus is the word & | together with it's meaning.
“‘Toothache’ is a word which I use in a game which I play with other people, but it has a private meaning to me.”
“Christen toothache”
Changing the meaning of a word. Meaning connected with the use of the ostensive definition.
In the use of the word meaning it is essential
ड Ms-149,12v
that the same meaning is kept throughout a game.
Consider a game in which this isn't so. Would you call this sort of activity a game?
“Are you sure that you call ‘toothache’ always the same private experience?”
‘I recognize it as being the same’. And are you also recognizing the meaning of the word as the same, so you can be sure that “recognizing it to be the same” now means the same to you which it did before?
“But in ostensively defining a word for myself I impress it's meaning on me so as not to forget it later on”. But how do you know that this helps. How do you know later on whether you remember it rightly or wrongly.
Can you recognize something to be red which isn't red?
To be sure that so & so is the case. To know: Does ‘p’ follow from ‘I know p’?
ड Ms-149,13r
The normal case of being sure, of a strong conviction.
Does it make sense to say, that what you see is green, & you recognize it to be red?
“It seems to me to have sense”.
You are undoubtedly using a picture therefore it ‘seems to you to make | have sense’. But ask yourself what use you are making of that picture? We shall have to talk about sense & nonsense later.
What's the use here of being sure if it doesn't follow that it is so & if your being sure is the only criterion there is to | for it being so?
That means: This isn't at all a case of being sure, of conviction.
The word ‘recognizing as …’ is used where you can be wrong in recognizing.
—Sometimes these bodies change their weight & then we look for the cause (of it)|of the change & find , say, that something's come off the body.
ड Ms-149,13v
Sometimes however the weight of a body changes & we can't account for it | the change at all. But we nevertheless don't say that weighing it had lost its point “because now the body really doesn't have any one weight”. Rather we say that the body had changed somehow that this was the cause of the change of weight but that hitherto we are not | have not found this cause. That is, we shall|will go on playing the game of weighing & | we try to find an explanation for the exceptional behaviour.
We talk of | use the formal expression “the weight of a|this body” to designate something inherent in the body something which could only be demolished by destroying part of the body. The same body — the same weight. (And this is a grammatical proposition )
Green.
Supposing what in fact is the rule became the exception. Under certain peculiar circumstances indeed a body kept on weighing the same. Say iron in the presence of mercury. Must a piece of cheese on the other hand though keeping its size, calories weigh
ड Ms-149,14r
different weights at different times unaccountably.
…
On the one hand it seems that if there wasn't the behaviour of it.
“So & so has excellent teeth, he never had to go to the dentist, never complained about toothache; but as toothache is a private experience we can't know whether he hasn't had terrible toothache all his life”.
⇆
What is an assumption that e.g. ‘A has toothache’? Is it saying the words “A has toothache”? Or doesn't it consist in doing …|something with these words? How does one assume such & such to be the case?⇄
A game of assumption: ---
Assuming: a state of mind. Assuming: a gesture.
“But the point is just that we don't assume that we have toothache. Therefore even if we have no ground for assuming that anyone else has toothache we may nevertheless know that we have.” But would we in this case at all talk of a
ड Ms-149,14v
(particular) behaviour as a symptom of pains? “Suppose no one knew pains except I, & I just invented a name ‘abracadabra’ for it!”
Showing his grief, —hiding his grief.
Certain behaviour under certain circumstances we call showing our toothache other behaviour, hiding our toothache. Now would we talk about this behaviour in this way if people didn't ordinarily behave in the way they do? Suppose I & they described my behaviour without such a word as pain, would the description be incomplete? The question is : do I consider it incomplete? If so I will distinguish between two cases of my behaviour & the others will say that I use two words alternately for my behaviour & thereby they will acknowledge that I have toothache.
“But can't he have toothache without in any way showing it? And this shows that the word ‘toothache’ has a meaning entirely independent of a behaviour connected with toothache.”
ड Ms-149,15r
“The game which we play with the word ‘toothache’ entirely depends upon there being a behaviour which we call the expression of toothache.
“We use ‘toothache’ as the name of a personal experience”.— Well let's see how we use the word!
“But you know the sensation of toothache! So you can give it a name, say, ‘toothache’.”
But what is it like to give a sensation a name? Say it is pronouncing the name while one has the sensation & possibly concentrating on the sensation, — but what of it? Does this name thereby get magic powers? And why on earth do I call these sounds the ‘name’ of the sensation? I know what I do with the name of a man or of a number but have I by this act of ‘definition’ given the name a use?
“I know what toothache is”. But how do I know that I know it? Because something comes before my mind? But|And how do I know that that is the right
ड Ms-149,15v
thing? Because I recognize it? But then it doesn't matter what it is, as long as I recognize it as toothache! …
“But when you ask me “do you know what toothache is” I answer yes after having brought before my mind a certain sensation.” But now is this certain sensation characterised? Only by that that it comes when you say the word ‘toothache ’? Or that it comes & you are in some way satisfied?
“To give a sensation a name” means nothing unless I know already in what sort of a game this name is to be used.
I've described certain behaviour by: ‘it is obvious that he was hiding his pain’ or: ‘I think he was hiding his pain’ or ‘I don't know at all whether he was hiding pain’.
But can't I just assume with some degree of certainty that he has
ड Ms-149,16r
to any part use of the word
pain although I have no reason whatever for it? I can say “I assume…”, but if I sent them all to the doctor although they showed no sign of illness|pain, I should just be called mad.
That we try to account for something is due to the fact that we often can account for it. If I saw no regularity whatever I should not be inclined to assume | say that there is one which I haven't or yet discovered. What usually happens makes me take this point of view.
The ‘private definition’ is not binding.
In our private language game we had, it seemed, given a name to an impression, — in order, of course, to use it | the name for this impression in the future. The def., that is, should have determined on future occasions for what impressions to use the word ‘red’ | name & for which not to use it. Now we said that on certain occasions we were inclined | we didn't after having given the def. we used the word on others ; but we described these
ड Ms-149,16v
occasions only by saying that we had ‘certain impressions’ that is we didn't describe them at all. The only thing that characterized them was that we used such & such words. What seemed … to be a definition didn't play the role of a def. at all, it did not justify one subsequent use of the word and all that remains of our | your | one's private language game is therefore that I|you sometimes without justifying my particular reason write a word | the word ‘red’ into my diary — without any justification whatever.
“But surely I feel justified when normally I use the word ‘red’ although I don't think of a def. while doing ‘so’. Do you mean that whenever normally you use the word ‘red’ you have a particular feeling which you call a feeling of justification. I wonder if that is true. But true or not| anyhow by ‘justification’ I didn't mean a feeling. But I think I know what makes you say that or saying e.g. this chair|book is red you have a feeling of being justified in using the word. For you might ask: is there there an obvious difference
ड Ms-149,17r
between the case in which I use | apply|use a word in its well known meaning|as when I say <…> to someone ’the sky is blue today‘ & the case in which I apply | say any arbitrary word or such an occasion e.g. ’the sky is moo‘. In this case, you will say, I either know that I am just fixing | giving a meaning to the word ’moo‘ or else I shall feel that I have no justification whatever to use|there is no justification whatever for using the word. The word is just any word & not the appropriate word. I quite agree that there is a difference in experience between the cases of ’using the name of the colour’, ’giving a new name to the colour’ & ‘using any | some arbitrary word in the place of the name of the colour’. But that doesn't mean that it is correct to say that I have a feeling of appropriateness in the first case which is absent in the third. “But ‘red’ somehow seems to us to fit this colour”. We certainly may be inclined to say this sentence of certain but it would be wrong to say that therefore we had a feeling of fitting when ordinarily we said that something was red.
“But do you mean that one man couldn't play a game of chess with himself &
ड Ms-149,17v
without anyone else knowing that he did?— What, would you say, he should do in order that we may say he is playing| to be playing with himself a private game of chess? Just anything?— Would you say he must go through certain private experiences which I can indirectly describe by saying that they are the experiences which he has when playing a certain game chess (in the ordinary sense of the word)? I suppose you would say e.g. that he imagines a chessboard with the chessmen on it, then | that he imagines certain moves etc.. And on being | if you were asked what it means to imagine a chessboard, you would explain it by pointing to a real chessboard or, the | say to a picture of one and analogously if you were asked what does it mean to imagine cast…ling etc. | the king of chess, a pawn, a knight's mo…ve etc.. Or should you have said: He must go through certain …. But what private experiences are there & will any of them do in this case? For
ड Ms-149,18r
instance feeling hot?. But you don't understand me.| No. | “No!” The private experience I am talking of must have the multiplicity of the game of chess: But remember what we have said of | again does he recognize two private experiences to be different by a further private experience & this to be the
[private experiences in fiction.]
same in the different cases? Mustn't we say in this case that we can't say anything whatever about private experiences & are in fact not entitled to use the words experiences at all? What makes us believe that … we are in, that we really think of the case in which we can describe his private experiences describing different kind | ways of playing chess in one's imagination.
How can we say he may see red although nobody may be able to find it out?
If we go through with this idea of the|a private experience which we don't know we can't talk of a certain private experience either, because
ड Ms-149,18v
this expression is taken from the case in which what we don't know is say, whether if he says he uses red he sees red & not perhaps blue green or yellow.
in which it attends to a certain class of experiences which we know though we don't know which one of it's members he has. Rather the private experiences|impressions which we imagine as the background to the foreground of our actions dissolve… into a mist which we wished to talk about & imagined to be back of our action dissolve into a mist …
Rather the private experiences which we imagined as an unknown x , y, z etc. behind our actions, dissolve into a mist & into nothing.
One might suggest—: The word ‘toothache’ on the one hand for a behaviour & on the other hand for a private experience. The connection is that when a man has the private experience he tends to behave in the particular way.
ड Ms-149,19r
But why should you talk of a private experience & not 100 private experiences, as you don't know whether there is any red or whether there are 100?
What is so confusing here is to talk of the meaning of the word instead of of the use.
The idea of different kinds of objects.
Why should you know better what experiencing is like with the other person than what seeing red is like?
If you were very careful you would say “a certain … something”.
What does it consist in | is happening | is it that happens when in one case I say “I have toothache|see red & mean it, am not lying, & on the other hand I say the words but know that they are not true, or say them not knowing what exactly they mean etc.?
The criteria for it being the truth have to be laid down beforehand in common language|are laid down in language (rules, charts etc.). “But how am I to know how in the particular case to apply them?— For ||For, being laid down…| For in so far as they
ड Ms-149,19v
are laid down in common language they join the rest of what is thus laid down|are|become just part of the common language game i.e. they don't help me in any particular case. They join in with all the rest of … not helping me|& don't help me in my particular private decision.
| They join the rest of the rules of common language .
Is there such a thing as justifying what in the particular case I do just by what then further is the case an not by rule? Can I say : I am now justified in using the sentence just by what is now the case…?
No!
Nor can I say|does it help me to say I am justified “when I feel justified”. For about feeling justified the same things can be said as about feeling toothache.
My criteria for having toothache are the same as| saying I have toothache is no other than for the others saying I have toothache, for I can't say that feeling, or having, toothache is my criterion for having a right to say it.
Examine: ‘These two operations bring about the same pain’. The pain which they all bring about I shall call toothache.
What does this shew?? Now I might explain Did I give the name ‘toothache’ to a behaviour ? Did I call a behaviour “having toothache”? Did I call a behaviour “having the same pain”? But showing toothache can never be saying
Ich glaube ich wollte zeigen, daß ‘toothache’ hier nicht als Name eines Benehmens gegeben wird & daß man auch nicht auf eine Erfahrung hinten dem Benehmen zeigt.
I must assume an expression which is not lying.
Now do I say that there is
ड Ms-149,20r
not the experience of toothache but only the behaviour ?!?
When I say that moaning is the expression of toothache then under certain circumstances the possibility of it being the expression without the feeling behind it mustn't enter my game.
Es ist Unsinn zu sagen: der Ausdruck kann immer lügen .
The language games with expressions of feelings (private experiences) are based on games with expressions of which we don't say that they may lie.
“But was I when a baby taught that toothache meant my expression of toothache?”— I was told that a certain behaviour was called expression of toothache.
“But isn't it possible that a child should behave just as a normal child when it has toothache & not have toothache?”
ड Ms-149,20v
But does if we speak of the baby, ‘having toothache’ mean the same as ‘behaving such & such’?
We say “poor thing, it moans”.
“Can't I in the child too, separate the moaning from the pain. Can't I say that I pity it because it has pain not because it moans?
You ought I suppose to say what you pity it because you believe that it has pains. But what is believing that it has pains like, as opposed to believing|just seeing that it moans? It doesn't here consist in believing that he doesn't check toothache but in a different experience.
“Something clicked in my brain|mind when I came to this colour”. (This is a gesture) But did you know from the clicking that it was red. Supposing looking at this colour your eyes opened wider & you gave a jerk, — was it by its producing this reaction that you recognized
ड Ms-149,21r
the colour is being red? I saw a particular colour concentrated on it & the word red came without tension. Indeed this is the phenomenon we call recognition but we call it that because it happens under circumstances where we have other criteria for saying that we've recognized the object.
“But surely there is a case in which I'm justified to say “I see red”, where I'm not lying, & one where I'm not justified in saying this | so!” Of course I can be justified by the ostensive def. or by asking the others “now isn't this red?” & they answer that it is. But you didn't mean this justification, but one that|which justifies me privately whatever others will say.
“But do you mean to say that the truth or falsehood of my saying ‘I see red’ does not consist in there being red before my mind's eye in one case & not in the other; but that it depends on such things as ⌇ emph whether I say it in this or that tone of voice| with a certain tension or without?” ⌇ emph
ड Ms-149,21v
If I say “I see red” without reason, how can I distinguish between saying it with truth & saying it as a lie?
It is important here that that I exclude the case|that there is no case there is no such case as of saying the untruth by mistake.
Hier haben wir keinen Vergleich des Satzes mit der Wirklichkeit! (Kollationen)
Don't I know, when I say “I see red” & am lying, that I am lying?— When do I translate my experience into the words expressing my knowledge? One might say: knowing that I am lying doesn't mean saying that I do but being ready to say it.
I could say: Lying is characterised by a peculiar|an experience of tension. What is it like to know that I don't see red & to say that I do?
“Well it is simply not seeing red & saying “I see red”! There is nothing
ड Ms-149,22r
problematic about|in this, as seeing & saying something are utterly independent.”
“What I now call …”
[We never dispute the opinions of common sense but we question the expression of common sense]
Suppose I said “I see red” & was lying for I actually saw red — but had made a slip of the tongue.
But which lie was it I had said, or (rather) thought? Of course I may say later “I wanted to say “I see green” but did anything correspond to these words while I said “I see red”?”
But suppose that he felt that he was lying but never said so, — did he know that he was lying or not?
“Did he know that he was doing, what we call lying?” “Did he know that he was doing what on other occasions he called lying?”
What is his criterion for saying
ड Ms-149,22v
— wanting to speak the truth, — that he is|was lying? Is there a criterion?
Do|Are these two sentences to say the same : “He says he sees red & really sees red” & he says he sees red with conviction|and has the experience of not lying?
“So you think seeing red consists in saying ‘I see red’ in a certain tone of voice?”— No, but saying “I see red” & seeing it might be saying it in a particular tone of voice.
How do I imagine myself seeing red? Isn't it by imagining red?! But how do I imagine myself addressing a meeting?
Imagine a Robinson lying to himself.— Why is this difficult to imagine?
Look at something red & say to yourself “I see green” a) meaning by ‘green’ what usually you mean by ‘red’ (i.e. speaking the truth) b) lying.
ड Ms-149,23r
But one might call it lying to oneself if one e.g. turns one's watch forward to make oneself get up earlier.
Falsifying an account. I add up numbers arrive at 2730 then rub out 3 & put a 5 instead.
When in this <…> we talk of lying it ought always to mean subjectively lying & subjectively lying to the other person & not to oneself.
If I see green without saying I see green , in what way can these words be said to describe what I see?
One could imagine someone constantly lying subjectively but not objectively.
Imagine this case: Someone has a particular way if lying, he… He always lies calling red ‘green’ & green ‘red’, but as a matter of fact what he says agrees with the usage of the other people & so his lying is never noticed. //taken notice of.//
ड Ms-149,23v
Supposing one said: To see red means to see that which makes me inclined to describe it by saying ‘…’.
“To know that I am lying means to have that | an experience which I should describe by the words ‘…’.”
[Our language on the one hand has very much more possibilities of expression than logicians admit|dream of|imagine & on the other hand the uses of it's|these modes of expression are very much more limited than logicians|they imagine.]
What makes lying “I see red” into lying? The subjective | private experience of not seeing red or the private experience of feeling a certain tension?
Is it wrong to say that lying in such & such cases consists in saying so & so & feeling a tension?
Man könnte sehr wohl sagen daß manchmal die Lüge dadurch charakterisiert ist daß ich mir bewußt bin daß es sich anderes
ड Ms-149,24r
verhält, & manchmal nicht so, sondern dadurch, daß ich die Spannung des schlechten Gewissens spüre; etc..
Wenn ich nun sage “der lügt, der sagt ‘ich sehe rot’ & sieht grün”, so stimmt das nicht, denn ich mußte sagen “der lügt der sagt ‘ich sehe rot’ & weißt (oder glaubt) er sieht grün”.
“Der lügt, der sagt “ich sehe rot” & sieht die Farbe, die er selbst mit dem Worte grün bezeichnen würde.” Aber das heißt doch wahrheitsgemäß so bezeichnen würde. Oder können wir sagen, “für sich so bezeichnen würde”?
Daher ja die Idee daß man lügen kann sondern man laut das eine & leise das andre sagt & was man laut sagt ist hier die Lüge.
“Der weiß, welche Farbe er sieht, der es irgendwie ausdrücken könnte.” Was ist das Kriterium dafür daß, er das | es könnte?
Was soll es dann heißen : einer Farbeneindruck wahrheitsgemäß mit ‘rot’ bezeichnen? Paßt das Wort dem einen Eindruck besser als dem anderen?
ड Ms-149,24v
Man könnte hier auch sagen man solle gar nicht von subjektiver Wahrheit der Farben sprechen. Die Wahrheit des Satzes “Ich habe Zahnschmerzen” habe nur objektiv beurteilt zu werden.
“Das Wahre Wort kommt anders als das falsche.”
Man kann sagen: “Alle diese Worte sind in derselben Weise gekommen.”
Das Wort welches Du sprichst ist eine Reaktion. Die Reaktion die wir in dem Satz übersehen “er sieht …”.— Aber ist es nicht wahr daß der Andere nicht wissen braucht, daß meine Reaktion in dieser & dieser Weise vor sich geht? Er meint, ich sage ihm geradeheraus was ich sehe & es ist nicht so, sondern ich erfinde eine Lüge.
“Er weiß nicht was ich sehe, bis ich es ihm sage; ich weiß es schon vorher // ehe er es erfährt//.” Könnte es auch umgekehrt sein?
ड Ms-149,25r
Ich habe jetzt lange mit einem Bleistift geschrieben : wußte ich in diesem Satz daß die Schrift grau & das Papier weiß ist?
Wußte ich das,|? oder wußte ich bloß, daß es ist wie es ist?
“Ich weiß, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe.”— “Ja, aber war nicht vor dieser ‘Reaktion’ schon etwas da, näm lich eben das Erlebnis, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe?”
“Können wir nicht doch sagen, daß etwas jedem sichtbar (äußerlich), geschah|geschieht & etwas weiteres nur mir wahrnehmbar|erkennbar, ‘in mir’?”
“How am I justified in saying that I see this apple red”. You are not justified.— But isn't it true that when I say the truth I am justified & when I'm lying I'm not justified.
How is a lie possible in a case where there is no justification?
Supposing one said, lying (here) consists in applying one word to the colour
ड Ms-149,25v
& not another? A misleading word instead of a not misleading one?
I am justified if the word comes in one way, & not justified if it comes in an other way. —But in which way?— If it comes in the straightforward way I'm justified But which is the straightforward way?— I know but can't explain as the paradigm of it is in me.— But as far as it's in you it serves no purpose in the future application of the word. (private ostensive def.)
How do I know that it comes in the straightforward way? What the straightforward way is must be fixed by a paradigm.
“Why on earth should it be wrong to use a word not in the simple (‘straightforward’) way?” Couldn't it not even be my duty to use the word which doesn't come straightforwardly? Imagine the case where we had laid down a code in which ‘red’ meant green.
ड Ms-149,26r
“I said the word with a bad conscience.”
What troubles me are the propositions in which an action is described accompanied by a ‘state of mind’.
“Lying when you say “I see red” consists in saying these words & having a private experience which I call ‘feeling unjustified ’, or ‘seeing green’ etc.”— “But suppose that I call the feeling of being justified “feeling unjustified”!?”— This|Nor this last sentence though it sounds absurd had sense.
“What you say comes to this: when you | I truly say ‘I see red’ you are | I am not justified in saying this by the | a fact that you | I see red”.— No I should say ---
“You either have a feeling of being unjustified or you don't!”
ड Ms-149,26v
“But surely there is a case in which I say ‘I see red’ & am telling the (subjective) truth & one in which I lie!”— Yes, that is, we distinguish between telling the|a case of telling the truth & not telling| of not telling the truth.— But what does lying in this|such a case, consist in? We may try all sorts of explanations: “It consists in saying … & seeing green”, “It consists in saying … & knowing that I see …”, “It consists in saying … & feeling that I'm not justified in saying this” & others. Now let me ask : do all these explanations come to the same or do they describe different facts? We might||can say : if they describe different cases|facts the differences are quite unimportant to us (here)|don't matter to us here. For our purpose they can all be said to describe the same fact|case. (We might have said lying consists in saying “I see red” & having stomach ache but as stomach ache is a private sensation why not rather consider the private sensation of seeing a colour other than red?) We may say therefore that these explanations for our purpose were no explanations at all. They left us just
ड Ms-149,27r
where we were , and they only (seem) (so) confirm|affirm say that the cases of lying & saying the truth are distinguished by the private experience accompanying the sentence. So let us put our questions like this: lying or our case consists in saying “I see red” & seeing green ,|: What does seeing green consist in? As an answer we immediately give ourselves a sample of green| ‘for green’. But is it essential that this sample should be what the others also call green? No it might be what they call yellow or blue or red etc.. But are you inclined to say “it might be what they call hot, cold or <…>”? Then after all you are thinking of games played with others though you left a certain latitude ….
When we talk of the private experience which the others don't know we don't originally mean to talk of a shapeless nothing but of a variable with certain definite value.
It is said sometimes that if I & someone else are looking at some objects I can never know what colours the other really sees. But with what
ड Ms-149,27v
right do we here speak of | use ‘colour’ & seeing? Some philosophers (e.g. Driesch) would here be inclined to think that they can solve the puzzle|save the situation by using the senseless phrase “We can't know what the other have”. Compare Driesch :
…. But as long as ‘to have’ here have any meaning at all it can't help us & when it has no meaning at all I think it can't help us either.
“We distinguish between … & …“ that means : We sometimes use the expression “I lied when I said that I saw green” sometimes | as opposed to “I told the truth when I said ‘…’”. But isn't this enough?— “But under what circumstances do you use the expression ‘…’”? But must I necessarily stop giving you circumstances when I have given you a sample? Why not when I have given you a word, a verbal expression? Is the use of such an expression necessarily indefinite as compared
ड Ms-149,28r
with the use of a sample — can't a sample be used, compared with objects, in many different ways?
The word lying is taught us in a particular way in which it was fastened to a certain behaviour to the use of a certain expression under certain circumstances. Then we use it saying that we have been lying when our behaviour was not like the one which first constituted the meaning.
Isn't in the same way we were thought the word ‘red’ in a game say like number one & then we use it when the conditions are different (compare the past in the description of a dream) (end of course it isn't just the word ‘red’ we use but the whole imagery connected with it)
“But you talk as though there was only the word ‘red’| expression ‘I see red’ but not an impression corresponding to it. On the contrary I don't say that when a man says … he also has the impression
ड Ms-149,28v
But is all that happens that you say ‘I see red’? Isn't there something else being the case, happening, when you say this & it is true? But if you ask isn't there something else happening, you don't mean just anything else e.g. that it's raining. So after all you have to give descriptions of what it is that happens| you mean is happening & insofar as you give a description of it you must know what it is that happens & it is not an | the x. And keeping it partly unknown doesn't help you either. On the other hand there is no reason why you should always stop with giving a sample & not with giving a word|an expression. (in this sense one can say that an expression acts as a picture)| as much as a picture as a sample)
The philosophical puzzle seems insoluble if we are frank to | with ourselves, & is, insoluble. That is until that is we change our question.
‘Expression ‘can always be lying’… How can we say this of the expression to which
ड Ms-149,29r
we fasten our words?
“But I always know whether I'm lying or not!” — you are first | now obsessed with the word | the use of the word ‘lying’. As a rule|In general you talk without thinking of lying & of whether you lie or not.
But (then) I'm always either lying or not lying! (Whether I always know it or not)
Suppose a child learnt the word ‘toothache’ as an equivalent for it…s moaning & noticed that whenever it said the word or moaned the grown-ups treated it particularly well. The child then uses moaning or the word ‘toothache’ as a means to bring about the desired effect : is the child lying?
You say : “Surely I can moan with toothache & I can moan without toothache, so why shouldn't it be so with the child? Of course I only see
ड Ms-149,29v
& hear the child's behaviour but from my own experience I know what toothache is (like) // I know toothache apart from behaviour// & I am led to believe that the others sometimes have the pains I have”.— The first sentence already is misleading : It isn't the question whether I can moan with & without toothache, the point is that I distinguish ‘moaning with toothache’ & ‘moaning without toothache’ & now we can't go on to say that of course in the child we make the same distinction. In fact we don't. We teach the child to use the words “I have toothache” to replace its moans, & this was how I myself|too was taught the expression. How do I know that I have learnt the word toothache to mean what they wanted me to express? I ought to say I believe I have toothache?
Now one can moan because one has pain, or e.g., one can moan on the stage. How do I know that the child, small as it is, doesn't already act & in this case I teach it to mean by ‘toothache’ something I don't want | intend it to mean?
I have taught the child to use the expression ‘I have toothache’
ड Ms-149,30r
under certain circumstances and now it uses the words under these circumstances.— But what are these circumstances? Shall we | I say | answer “the circumstances under which it moaned”, and what are these?
But now I also teach the child to moan on the stage! That is to say I even teach him | it to use this expression in a different game. I also teach it to read out the sentence ‘I have toothache’ out | from a book, when it hasn't toothache.
In fact I could teach it to lie, as a separate language game. (In fact we often play this kind of game with children)
“But doesn't what you say come to this that it doesn't matter what the persons feel as long as only they behave a particular way?”
“Do you mean that you can define pain in terms of behaviour?”
But is this what we do if we teach the child to use the expression ‘I have toothache’? Did I say|define : “Toothache is such & such a behaviour”? This would obviously be against| This obviously contradicts the normal use of the word! “But can't you, on the other hand,
ड Ms-149,30v
at least to yourself give an ostensive def. of ‘toothache’.” Pointing to the place of your pain & say “this is …”? “Can't I give a name to the pain I've got? Queer idea to give one pain a name! What's it do do with a name? Or what do I do with it? What I do with the name of a person whom I call by the name. I mean to say: What connection is the name to have with the pain. So far the only connection so far is this that you had toothache pointed to your cheek & said|pronounced the word ‘moo’. “So what?” Remember what we said about private ostensive definition.
“But aren't you neglecting something — the experience or whatever you might call it —? Almost the world behind the mere words?”
But here solipsism teaches | can teach us a lesson; It is the thought which is|It is that thought which is on the way to destroy this wrong idea. | error. For if the world is idea it isn't any person's idea. (Solipsism stops short of saying this & says that it is my idea). But then how could
ड Ms-149,31r
I say what the world was | is if the realm of ideas has no neighbour. What I do comes to defining the word world.
‘I neglect that which goes without saying.’
“What is seen I see” (pointing to my body) I point at my visual | geometrical eye, saying this. Or I point with closed eyes & touch my breast & feel it. In no case do I make a connection between what is seen & a person.
Back to ‘neglecting’! It seems that I neglect life. But not life physiologically understood but life as consciousness. And consciousness not physiologically understood; or, understood from the outside, but consciousness as the very essence of experience, & the appearance of the world, the world.
Couldn't I say : if I had to add the world to my language it would have to be one sign for the whole of language which sign could therefore be left out.
ड Ms-149,31v
Isn't what you reproach me of as though you said: “In your language you're only speaking !” ⇄
How am I to describe the way the child learns the word ‘toothache’ — like this? The child sometimes has toothache it moans & holds its cheek, the grown-ups say “…” etc.. Or : The child sometimes moans & holds its cheek, — the grown— ups “…”? Does the first description say something superfluous or false or does the second leave out something essential? Both descriptions are correct.
“But it seems as if you were neglecting something.” But what more can I do than distinguish the cases of saying ‘I have toothache’ when I really have toothache, & the case of saying the words without having the toothache?
I am also|further ready to talk of any x behind my words so long as it keeps its identity.
⇆
---But why should I say “I have toothache in his tooth”. I would insist on his tooth being extracted. Who
ड Ms-149,32r
is supposed to cry out if it is?
What does it mean distributing primary experience over all subjects? Imagine that they have all real toothaches in their teeth. The one which now only have. I now describe certain facts. (Not metaphysical ones but facts about the connection|coincidence of certain experiences.)
He gets a blow & cries,— I think: “no wonder for it really hurts”. But wouldn't I say to myself : Queer that he cries for I feel the pain all right,— but he?!
What does it consist in that I have pain, I feel myself crying, I hear that I am crying, my mouth cries?
It seems there is a phenomenon which in general I refer to as ‘my toothache’ which, experience teaches me, is always connected with one particular person (not ‘I’ but) Ludwig Wittgenstein. I now imagine facts other than they are & connect up this phenomenon to all sorts of persons so as to make it not at all tempting to call this phenomenon ‘my toothache’.
ड Ms-149,32v
Isn't it a particular phenomenon to hear myself speak (not, ‘to hear Ludwig Wittgenstein speak’). ---
“I see so & so” does not mean “The person so & so e.g. L.W. sees so & so”.
A language game in which everybody calls out what he sees but without saying “I see …”. Could anybody say that what I call out is incomplete because I have left out to mention the person?!
A language game in which everybody (& I too) call out what I see without mentioning me.
The always know what I see. If they don't seem to, I misunderstand what they say.
I am tempted to say: “It seems at least a fact of experience that at the source of the visual field there is mostly a small man with gray flannel trousers in fact L.W. .”— Someone might answer me to this: It is true
ड Ms-149,33r
you almost always wear gray flannel trousers & often look at them.
“Ich bin doch bevorzugt. Ich bin der Mittelpunkt der Welt.” Denken wir uns ich sähe mich in einem Spiegel das sagen & auf mich zeigen! Wäre es noch richtig?
When I say that I play a unique role I really mean the geometrical eye.
On the other hand if I describe the usual appearance of my body around the geometrical eye this is on the same level as saying that in the middle of the visual field there is in general a brown table & at the edges a white wall (as I generally sit in my room).
Now suppose I described this in the form : The visual world in general is like this :(follows the description). Would this be wrong?— Why should it be wrong?! But the question is, what game is to be played|I intend to be playing with this sentence, e.g., who is allowed to say it & what are the reactions to this statement|what the reactions to this statement are to be, // and how|in what way are the people who hear it| those to whom it is said to react // to
ड Ms-149,33v
to this statement|it //? I should like to say, that it's I who is to say it, not L.W., but th e person at the source of the visual field. But this I seem not to be able to explain to anyone but me.|anyone. (Queer state of affairs) The game played might be the one which is in general played with “I see so & so”.
Can't I say something to nobody, neither to anybody else nor to myself? What is the criterium of saying it to myself?
If I see a fire he runs to extinguish it.
At intervals I paint what I see. But can't someone else paint it for me? Or the picture be presented to me somehow, already finished?
What, if I see before me a picture of the room as I am seeing the room?
Is this a language game?
I want to say : “the visual world is like this …”,— but why say anything?
⇆
ड Ms-149,34r
// but why say anything?//
Der Solipsismus | // Die Auffassung des Solipsismus // erstreckt sich nicht auf Spiele. Der Andere kann so gut Schachspielen, wie ich | kann Schachspielen so gut wie ich.
I.e., when we play a language game we are on the same level.
“I am in the lucky position of being in the source of the visual world|field. It is I who see it.” I have a comfortable feeling while saying this although the statement isn't one of the class of statement which in general give me this kind of feeling. I said it as though I had said I am the wealthiest man in the place|have more money than anyone else.
But the point is that I don't establish a relation between a person & what is seen. All I do is that alternately I point in front of me & to myself.
⇄
But what I now see, this room|this view of my room, plays a unique role, it is the visual world!
(Der Solipsist flattert & flattert in der Fliegenglocke, schlägt sich an an den Wanden, flattert weiter.|stößt sich an den Wanden, flattert weiter. Wie ist er zur Ruhe zu
ड Ms-149,34v
bringen?)
“---|description : this is what I know see”. Leave out the “see”, leave out the “now”, the “this” & leave out the “I”.
“(Description) : this is the visual world”. But why do you say visual & why do you say that it's the world?
“A red patch is (now) at the center”. All others must say “I see …”. But is this distinction necessary, as I know anyhow who's saying it, whether I or one of the others?
But the real question for me is here : How am I defined? Who is it, that is favoured? I But may I lift up my head to indicate who it is?
— Supposing I constantly change & my surrounding does : is there still some continuity namely by it being me & my surrounding that were changing?! | change?!
(Isn't this similar to thinking that when things in space| spacial things have changed entirely there's still one thing that
ड Ms-149,35r
remains the same, namely space.) (Space confused with room)
But is my hand favoured as compared to someone else's hand I see? This is ridiculous. Then either nobody is favoured or I am, that is the person L.W. whose hand lifted.
All right, — when I, L.W., see what's seen!
Where is my toothache? I.e. how is its place determined?
“What I now see justifies me in saying that I see red”. And what do you now see? If the answer is “this” it is no answer I give to myself. |The answer may be “this” but you <…> answer I don't tell myself what it is I see.
I don't see what I see more definitely if at the same time I see my finger pointing to it. (The question <…> to have been what are you now looking at).
I don't tell myself what it is I see by looking at | seeing my finger pointing to something. Suppose I said : “What I now see justifies me in saying “I see red” because it is the same colour as this sample”,
ड Ms-149,35v
this is a justification only if I use the word | expression “the same colour” in a fixed way. That is when we judge how this word is used or the ordinary grounds of behaviour etc.
Is the criterion for my playing a private game of chess my being however strongly inclined to say that I am playing one ?
How does one feel whether I am strongly inclined?
What would I say if I in my private judgements came into contradiction with all other people. I.e. if I could not longer play a language game with them. Or if all the facts around me became extraordinary? Would I stick to my judgements?
Suppose someone asked me “What does it mean to play a private game of chess with oneself” & I answered : “Anything, because if I said that I was playing a game of chess I would be so
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convinced | sure that I was that I would stick to what I said whatever anyone else anyhow say.”
Under what circumstances would we say that he did what we call portraying & under what circumstances that he called something portraying which we didn't call that? Suppose here we said : Well I can never know what he does <…> would this be anything than resignation?
Suppose someone painted pictures of the landscape which surrounds it, he sometimes paints the leaves of trees orange sometimes blue, sometimes the clear sky red etc. Under what circumstances would we agree with him that he was portraying the landscape?
We call something a calculation if, for instance, it leads to a house being built.
⇆
But can't he play a game with the colournames against whatever anybody else says? But why should we call it a game with the colournames. “But if I played it I would stick to saying that I was playing a game with the colournames.” But is that all I can say about it; is all that I can say for its being this kind of game that I stick to calling it so?
↺ We call something a language game if it plays a particular role in our
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human life. ⇄
Under what circumstances would | do I say I am entitled to say that I'm seeing red. The answer is showing a sample i.e. giving the rule. But if now I came into obvious | constant contradiction with what anybody else said, should I not say that I am applying the rule in a way which prevents me from playing their game. That is : is all that is necessary that the rule I give should be the rule they give or isn't besides this an agreement in the application necessary?
If “he has the | having the same pain” means the same as “he says | saying that he | one has the same pain” then “I have the same pain” means the same as “I say that I have the same pain” & the exclamation ‘oh!’ means “I say ‘oh!’”.
Roughly speaking : The word | expression of | ’I have toothache‘ stands for a moan but it does not mean ’I moan’.
But if “I have toothache” stands for a
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moan, what does “he has toothache” stand for?
One might say : it too stands for a moan, that of compassion.
“toothache, seeing etc. I only know from myself & not from the other.”
“I never know that he has toothache, I only know when I have it.”
“I can only believe that he has it, that he has what I have.”
“Has ‘toothache’ then a different meaning in my case & in his?”
“Isn't it possible that everybody should have toothache but without expressing it?”
“If it is possible that sometimes one can have ‘toothache’ without expressing, it is possible that always this should be so.”
“If my personal experience is all I know how can I even assume that there is any other besides?”
“Does ‘toothache’ in the other mean behaviour?”
“I only know what I mean by ‘toothache’.”
“I was thinking the word ‘toothache’ in connection with my behaviour but interpreted it to mean my pain”.
“Only my ‘toothache’ is real toothache”.
“What justifies me in saying that the other has toothache in his behaviour, what justifies in saying that what I have is the experience of toothache.”
“Is there only the expression of toothache & not the toothache?”
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“I know what it means to say that the other has ‘toothache’ even if I have no means to find out whether he has.”
“Only he knows whether he has toothache, we can never know.”
“Does the I enter into the personal experience or not?”
•
are speaking the truth
We aren't lying if a fact corresponds to the sentence. This is no explanation at all but a mere repetition unless we can supplement it by ‘namely this↗’ & a demonstration & the whole explanation lies just in this demonstration. The whole problem here only arose through the fact that in this case the demonstration is of a different kind, indirect that the demonstration of ‘I see red’, ‘I have toothache’ seems ‘<…>’ • If say we must assume an expression which can't lie this can't be explained by saying, that really pain | pain really corresponds to this expression.
“But aren't you saying, that
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all that happens is the moaning & that there is nothing behind it?”—
I am saying that there is nothing behind the moaning.
“Do you deny that the moaning is the expression of something”. No, that is I too should call moaning a n expression (or even an expression of something though this is misleading). But the word expression here only characterizes the language game played with it. I react differently
“So, you don't really have pain, you just moan?!”— There seems to be a description of my behaviour & also, in the same sense a description of my experience my pain! The one so to speak the description of an external the other often internal fact. This correspond to the idea that in the sense in which I can give a part of my body a name. I can give a name to a private experience. (only indirectly)
And I am drawing your attention to this that the language games are
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very much more different than you think|it appears.
You couldn't call moaning a description! But this shows you how far the proposition “I have toothache” is from a ‘description’, & how far teaching the use of the word toothache is from teaching the word tooth.
One could from the beginning teach the child the expression “I think he has toothache” instead of “he has toothache” with the corresponding doubtful|uncertain tone of voice. This mode of expression could be described by saying that we can only believe that the owner has toothache.
But why not in the child's own case? Because there the tone of voice is simply determined by nature.
In “I have toothache” the expression of pain is brought to the same form as a description “I have a matchbox| used <…> 5 shillings”.
We teach the child to say “I have been lying” when it has behaved in a certain way. Imagine here a typical case of a lie Also this expression goes along with a
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particular situation, facial expressions, say of shame, tones of reproach etc.
But doesn't the child know that it is lying before ever I teach him the word|verbal expression? Is this a metaphysical question or a question about facts? It doesn't know it as words. And why should it know it at all?— “But do you assume that it has only the facial expression of shame, e.g., without the feeling of shame? Mustn't you describe the inside situation as well as the outside one?”— But what if I said that by facial expression of shame I meant what you mean by the facial expression & the feeling, unless I explicitly distinguish between genuine, & faked|simulated facial expressions? It is, I think, misleading to describe the genuine expression as a sum of the expression & something else, though it is just as misleading to say that the genuine expression is nothing but|besides a particular behaviour. | //is a particular behaviour & nothing besides.// We just mistake | misunderstand / get the function of our words|expressions // of language // if we|by //://
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We teach the child the use of the word “to speak”. =Later it uses the expression “I speak|spoke to myself”.= We then say “We never know whether & what a person speaks to himself”.
Surely the description of the facial expression can be meant (used)|is used as a description of feelings & can be meant|used otherwise. We constantly use such expressions as “When he heard that he made|pulled a long face” & don't add that the expression was genuine. In other cases we describe the acting of a person in the same words or again we wish to leave it open whether the question was genuine or not. To say that a description of expressions used as a description of feelings is indirect|we describe the feeling indirectly by the description of expressions is wrong!
Imagine a language in which toothache is called “moaning” & the difference between just moaning & moaning with pain is expressed by the moaning or dry tone in which the word is pronounced.
People would not say in this language that it became clear later on that
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A didn't really have pain, but they would perhaps in an angry tone say that at first he moaned & then he suddenly laughed.
Suppose he says to himself “ I lie”, how do we know whether he means it?|what is to show that he means it? But we should | would any day|time describe this lying by saying: “He said… & told himself at the same time that he was lying”. Is this too an indirect description of lying?
But couldn't one say that if I speak of a man's angry voice meaning that he was angry & again of his angry voice not meaning that he was angry in the first case the meaning of the description of his voice was much further reaching than in the second case? I will admit that our description in the first case doesn't admit anything & is as complete as though we had said that he really was angry,— but somehow the meaning of the expression then goes beyond | reaches below the surface.
But how does it do that? The answer to this would be an explanation of the use|two uses of the expression. But how could this explanation reach
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under the surface? It is an explanation about symbols | signs & it states in which cases these signs | symbols are used. But how does it characterize these|the cases? Can it in the end do more than distinguish two expressions? I.e. describe a game with two expressions?
“Then is there nothing under the surface?!” But I said that I was going to distinguish two expressions, one for the ‘surface’ & one for ‘what is below the surface’ only remember that these expressions themselves correspond to a picture, not to its usage. It is just as misleading to say that there is nothing but | just surface & nothing underneath it as that there is something below the surface & that there isn't just the surface. Because once we use|make use of the picture of the ‘surface’ it is most natural to use it such as to express the distinction as that between something on & something below the surface. | express with it the distinction as on & below the surface.
// Because we naturally use the|this picture to express the distinction as that between ‘on the surface’ & ‘below the surface’ // But we misapply the picture if we ask whether both cases are or aren't on the surface.
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Now in order that with its normal meaning we should teach a child the expression “I have lied” the child must behave in the normal way . E.g. it must under certain circumstances ‘admit’ that it lied, it must do so with a certain facial expression etc. etc. etc.. We may not always find out whether he lied or not but if we never found out the word would have a different meaning. “But once he has learnt the word he can't be in doubt whether he is lying or not!”— Consider the case of the person who finds that his subjective lies are jugded by the ordinary criteria, truths. He says that he has been to school feeling that it's a lie but the teacher the boys confirm that he has been etc. etc.. You might say: “But surely he can't doubt that he said a subjective lie”.
This of course is like saying that he can't be in doubt about whether he has toothache or whether he sees red etc. On the one hand : doubting whether I have the experience <…> is not like doubting whether someone else has it. Remember what we said about the asymmetry of the game No 1. On the other hand
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one can't say “surely I must know what it is I see” unless to know what I see is to mean to see whatever I see. The question is what are we to call “knowing what it is I see”, “not being in doubt about what it is I see”. Under what circumstances are we to say that a person is in no doubt or in doubt about this? (Such cases as being in no doubt about whether this looks red to the normal eye & analogous one of course don't interest us here.) I suppose that the knowledge of what it is I see must be the knowledge that it is so & so I see. ‘So & so’ standing for some expression verbal or otherwise. (But remember that I don't give myself an information by pointing to something I see with my finger & saying to myself I see this.) ‘So & so’ in fact stands for an expression|a word of a language game. And doubting what it is I see will be | is doubting what e.g. what to call what I see.
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Doubting e.g. whether to say “I see red” or “I see green”. “But this is a simple doubt about the <…> of a colour & it can be settled by asking someone what this colour (pointing) is called”. But are all such doubts removable by this question (or which comes to the same by giving a definition “I shall call this colour so & so”)?
“What colour do you see?”— “I don't know — is it red, or isn't it red; I don't know what colour it is I see.”— “ What do you mean? Is the colour constantly changing, or do do you see it so very <…> practically black?” Could I say then : “don't you see what you see ?” this obviously would make no sense.
Colour: black|red & white|blue <…>.
“What colour do you call: a, e, i, o or u?”— “I don't know which colour I see?”
“Primary colours are those used in flags”
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It is queer that one never uses brown on a flag & says it is a blend of yellow, black & red although nobody can really produce a proper brown by mixing these colours.
Is there a reason for not admitting brown as a primary colour?
Is it not enough that we <…> to group it with red, blue, green, etc.?
One sometimes thinks the reason is that we see transitions from brown to pure yellow, red, black; but so we do in the case of red etc.
Imagine all objects around us where <…>, I mean of the appearance of a white surface | paper or which the sun is shining, you would see the surface covered with tiny spots of red blue green yellow
Shall we say that a pointillist sees the objects as he paints them?
It seems as though, however the outward circumstances change, once the
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word is fastened to a particular personal experience, it now refrains it's meaning; and that therefore I can now use it with sense whatever may happen. To say that I can't doubt whether I see red is in a sense absurd as the game I play with the expression “I see red” doesn't contain a doubt of this form.
It seems,— whatever the circumstances I always know not whether to apply the word or not. It seems, at first it was a move in a special game, but then it becomes independent of this game.
(This reminds one of the way the idea of length seems to become emancipated from any particular method of meaning it.)
We are tempted to say: “damn it all, a rod has a particular length however I express it. And one could go on to say that if I see a rod I always see (know) how long it is although I can't say how many feet, meters etc. — But suppose I just say : I always know whether its <…> | it looks tiny or big!
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But can't the old game loose it's point when the circumstances change, so that the word | expression looses to have a meaning although of course I can still pronounce it.
He sticks to saying that he has been lying although none of the normal consequences follow. What is there left of the language game, except that he says the expression?
We learn the word ‘red’ under particular circumstances Certain object are usually red & keep their colour, most people agree with us in our colour judgements. Suppose all this changes : I see blood unaccountably sometimes one sometimes another colour & the people around me all make different statements. But couldn't I in all these cases retain the | my meaning of ‘red’, ‘blue’, etc. although I couldn't make myself understood to anyone?
Samples e.g. would all constantly change their colour — ‘or does it only seem so to me?’ “Now am I mad or have I really called this ‘red’ yesterday?”
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The situation in which we are inclined to say “I must have gone mad!”
“But we could always call a colour- impression ‘red’ & stick to this application!”
Die Atmosphäre die dieses Probleme umgibt ist schrecklich. Dichte Nebel der Sprache sind um den problematischen Punkt gelagert. Es ist bei nahe unmöglich zu ihm vorzubringen.
Suppose I had before me drawings of what I & other people now see & I said of the drawing of what I see “there is something unique about this picture”.
If I can speak about ‘what is seen’, why shouldn't anyone else speak about it?— But I have a feeling that only I can; if I assume that others also speak about what normally I should call my visual image there seems to me to be something
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wrong with this assumption.
If ‘what I see’ has nothing to do with a particular person why should I feel that there's something wrong in assuming that anybody might talk about it i.e. mean it when he speaks? Then of course I can't tell them what I see nor they me what they see any more than I can tell myself what I see.
But they could make <…> as to what might happen in future in our visual field.
In the normal game I say : “I don't know what they see, — but in the game I'm considering they would as much know what I see as my hand can write down what my mouth can say.
And their different conjecture would be like conjectures made by myself at different times.
Can my mouth tell my hand what I see in order that my hand should be able to write it down?
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Do I by painting what I see tell myself what I see?
“This picture is unique, for it represents what is really seen”.
What justification do I have to say this // What is my justification for saying this?//
I see two spots on this wall & lift two fingers. Do I tell myself that I see two spots? But on the other hand couldn't this be the sign for my seeing two spots?!
Ist das Bild ausgezeichnet oder zeichne ich es aus?
“Today he points to me, & yesterday he pointed to me also.”
The meaning of : “He points at me.
“I see that he points at A”
“I see that he points at me”
You seem to be able to give yourself a sort of ostensive explana
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tion of what the expression “What is seen” refers to.
Imagine a game: One person tells the other what he (the other) sees if he has guessed it rightly he is rewarded. If A hasn't guessed correctly what B sees B corrects him & says what it is he sees. This game is more instructive if we imagine the persons not to say what is seen but to paint it or to make models of it. — Now let me imagine that I am one of the players.
Wouldn't I be tempted to say : “The game is asymmetrical, for only what I say I see corresponds to a visual image.
The problem lies thus : This ↗) is what is seen; & this is also what I see.
Frage Dich : Kann das ↗) nur ich sehen, aber kann es auch ein Andres sehen?
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Warum nur ich?
Für mich existiert kein Unterschied zwischen ich & das↗; & das Wort “ich” ist für mich kein Signal, das einen Ort oder eine Person hervorhebt | bezeichnet| //eines Orts oder einer Person//.
Ich versuche das ganz Problem auf das <…> | nicht verstehen <…> der Funktion des Wortes ‘Ich’ & ‘↗’ zu reduzieren
When I stare | am at a coloured object & say “this is red” I seem to know exactly to what I give the name red. As it were to that which I am drinking in.
It is as though there was a magic power in the words “this is…”.
I can bring myself to say : There is no toothache there ↗ (in the man's cheek who says he has toothache ). And what would be the expression for this in ordinary language? Wouldn't it be my saying “I have no toothache there”?
“But who says this?”— “I!” And who says
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this?— “I!”---
Suppose I give this rule: “Whenever I said ‘I have toothache’, I shall from now on say ‘there is toothache’”.
I tell the waiter bring me always clear soup & thick soup to the others. He tries to remember my face.
Suppose I change my face (body) every day entirely, how is he to know which is me. But it's a question of the existence of the game. “If all chessmen were alike how should one know which is the king?”
Now it seems that, although he couldn't know which is me, I still could|would know it.
Suppose now I said : “it wasn't so & so, it was I asked for clear soup”, — couldn't I be wrong? Certainly. I.e. I may think that I asked him, but didn't. Now are there two mistakes I can make : one, thinking that I asked him, the other, thinking that I asked him? I say: “I remember having asked him you yesterday”, he replies: “You weren't there at all yesterday”. Now I could say either
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“Well then I suppose I remember wrongly” or: “I was here only I looked like him yesterday”.
It seems that I can trace my identity quite independent of the identity of my body. And the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something dwelling in a body the identity of my mind.
149003
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“If anybody asks me to describe what I see, I describe what's seen.”
What we call a description of my sense datum, of what's seen, independent of what is the case in the physical world, is still a description for the other person.
If I speak of a description of my sense datum I don't mean to give a particular person as it's possessor.
(No more do I want to speak about a particular person when I moan with pain.)
It must be a serious & deepseated disease of language (one might also say ‘of thought’) which makes me say : “Of course this ↗) is what's really seen”.
149004 149005 149006
149007 149008
“property of space”
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I can tell you the fact because I know that p is the case. It has sense to say “it rained & I knew it” but not “I had toothache & knew that I had. “I know that I have toothache” means nothing or the same as “I have toothache”.
This, however, is a remark about the use of the word “I”, whoever uses it.
k149001
Examine the proposition|sentence|statement :“There is something there”, referring to the visual sensation I am now having. Aren't we inclined to think that this is a statement making sense & being true? And on the other hand, isn't it a pseudo statement?
But what (what entity) do you mean (refer to), when you say that sentence?— Aren't we here up against the old difficulty that it seems to us that meaning something was a special state or activity of mind? For it is
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true that saying these words I am in a special state of mind, I stare at something, — but this just doesn't constitute meaning.
Compare with this such a statement as :“surely|of course I know what I am referring to by the word toothache”.
Think of the state|frame|mental state of mind in which you say to yourself that p∙~p must|does make sense & by repeating a statement of this form you are , as it were, by introspection trying to find out what it means.
The state|phenomenon of staring is closely bound up with the whole puzzle of solipsism.
“If I am asked ‘what do you see?’, I describe the visual world.” — Couldn't I say instead of this “…I am describing what's|what is there↗” (pointing before me)?
But now consider the case of someone having a picture before him of the part of his room he is seeing & that he's saying:“ this in the picture is like this (a part of his visual field, as he is looking at his room).”
it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn't I say he was mistaken? “Why should I say this & not rather, he has forgot the meanings of his words.
But after all only I can lastly decide whether what he said, is right. “We can't assume that he knows what I see & I don't !” We can absolutely do this!
Can a man doubt whether what he sees is red or green? [Elaborate this]
“Surely if he sees | knows anything he must know that he sees!”— It is true that the game of “showing or telling what one sees” is one of the most fundamental language games, which means that what we in ordinary life call using language mostly presupposes this game.
I can for what I see use the impersonal form of description & the fact that I say “for what I see” doesn't say at all that after all this is only a disguised personal description! For I just expressed myself in English.|For I just expressed myself in our ordinary form of expression.
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Ist ein Würfel ein äußerst regelmäßiger symmetrischer Körper, oder das Unregelmäßige was ich sehe, wenn ich ihn vor einer Ecke aus sehe? Was soll ich hervorheben? Soll ich sagen er sei primär unregelmäßig aber man könne ihn als etwas Regelmäßiges unregelmäßig projiziert darstellen, oder er sei primär regelmäßig sei aber unregelmäßig projiziert gesehen?
149001
What's the difference between me being angry and him being angry?
If I wish to write down my experiences the two experiences that I am angry & that he is angry are absolutely entirely different (although the words used to describe them are very similar.) I might therefore naturally object to this way of expression.
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“Ein Würfel hat 9 reelle Kanten & 3 imaginäre.”
If I write down my own experiences nothing is more natural than to refer to ‘I’ only to my body|or Ludwig Wittgenstein's body as opposed to other bodies, but not to … distinguish my toothache from his by the words I & he.
The usual game played with the word ‘toothache’ involves the distinction of bodies which have the toothache.
Does the solipsist also say that only he can play chess?
But he will say that behind the sentence ‘I see …’ when he says it & it's true there stands something which does not stand behind “he sees” or ‘I see’ when the other man says it .
I'll start with a description of what ‘I see’ but in impersonal form.
‘Ich spreche’ & ‘der Andere spricht’ sind zwei
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total verschiedene Erfahrungen.
Ich sage “Es ist schön”, dann sage ich “das habe ich gesprochen”. Damit habe ich weder mir noch dem Andern gesagt wer es gesprochen hat. Ich habe einen gezeigt.
“Aber woher weiß ich daß ich gesprochen haben wenn nicht aus der eigentümlichen motorischen Erfahrung des Sprechens.
Das Wort ‘Ich’ bezeichnet keine Person.
Remember that, whatever the word ‘ I’ means to you, to the other man it shows|drives his attention to a human body & is of no value otherwise.
149002
Hat es einen Sinn zu sagen, der Stern bleibt beim gleichen Punkt?
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I could write say a book on Physics in which every sentence starts with “I remember”.
Could one say :Here the sentences are all directly backed by real experiences or by primary reality.
We must be misled in a queer way!
“Surely”, I want to say, “if I'm to be really quite frank I must say that I have something which nobody has”.— But who's I?— Hell! I don't express myself properly but there's something you can't deny that there is my personal experience & that this in a most important sense has no neighbour.— But you don't mean by that that it happens to be alone but that it…s grammatical position is that of having no neighbour.
“But somehow our language doesn't bring it out, that there is something unique namely real present experience, & do you just wish to advice me to resign myself to that?”
[A philosophical book might be entitled
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“the wonders of the jungle”.]
(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel that we have to resign ourselves to something by using ordinary language!)
How is it that the Auszeichnung we | I might propose for those sentences which describe my personal experience does … not really quite satisfy me?
Partly because of what we call “imagining that the other person sees (feels pain etc.)”.
D.h. wir sind geneigt dasselbe Bild für <…> Vorgänge zu verwenden.
Now imagine this: as soon as ever he has learned enough of language to be able to | say so | express it he tells us that he saw blue when he said ‘Is not red’.
This sounds as if then we really ought to be convinced that he saw blue etc.⇄
The person who paints his memories.
⇆
It reminds one misleadingly of :“as soon as ever
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he had learnt enough of their language the stranger informed his hosts of … ⇒•
Augustin, about expressing he wishes inside him.
Why shouldn't we consider the case that the child learns to think & always dreams. Had it had a private language before it learnt ours?
Only: What do we mean by learning the language? In what sense can we be said to teach the child the natural gesture-language? Or can't we teach him that?
Can't the child learn to wish for an apple by learning to draw an apple?
↔
⇐• This hangs together with the idea that the child remembers before it says it does .
Consider the case of the child drawing|painting its memories.
It has painted a blue light instead of a red one.
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Kreis & Ellipse. Soll ich sagen :“er hat der Kreis gestern als Ellipse gesehen”, oder so stellt er den folgende Tag einen Kreis dar”.
[Sich daran erinnern das & das gedacht zu haben. “Ich erinnere mich nicht an ihn aber ich weiß|erinnere mich daß er mir einer dümmlich Eindruck gemacht hat”]
“He mostly sees red where we see red”
The normal use of the expression “he sees green where…” is this: We take it as the criterion for meaning the same by ‘red’ as the other people | we do that as a rule he argues with them | us in giving the same names to the colours of objects as they | we do. If then in a particular instant he says something is red when we should say that it's green we say that he sees it differently from us.
Notice how in such a case we would behave. We should look for a cause of his differing judgement & if we had found one we should certainly be inclined to say he saw red when we saw green.
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It is further clear that even before even finding such a cause we might under circumstances be inclined to say this. But also that we can't give a strict rule for ….
Consider this case: someone says it's green| I can't understand it I see everything green | blue today & vice versa. We answer: it must look queer! He says it does & e.g. goes on to say how cold the glowing coal looks & how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should under these or similar circumstances be inclined to say that he saw red what we saw green. And again we should say that we know that he means by the words blue & red what we do as he has always used them as we did|had.
On the other hand: Someone tells us today that yesterday he always saw everything red, blue and so on. We say: But you called the glowing coal red you know & the sky blue. He answers: That was because I had also
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changed the names. We say: But didn't it feel very queer & he says: No it seemed all perfectly ordinary|natural. Would we in this case too say: …?
Case of contradictory memory images. tomorrow he remembers this, the day after tomorrow something else.
The whole trend, to show the expression “letting one look through his soul” is often misleading.
Back to the example of the number of afterimages. We can say that these cases are not cases of communications of personal experiences if there were no personal experiences but only ‘the outward signs’?
Now I ask what are our criteria for there being or there having been a personal experience beside the expression? And here the answer seems to be that for the outsider //the other man// the criteria are indeed more outside expressions but that I myself know whether I have an experience or not in particular
ड Ms-149,6r
whether I see red or not.
But let me ask what is knowing that I see red like: I mean: look at something red ‘know that it is red’ & ask|observe| //mark// yourself what you're doing. Don't you mean seeing red & impressing it on your mind that you are doing so? But there are, I suppose, several things that you are doing : You probably say to yourself the word ‘red’ or ‘this is red’ or something of the sort, or perhaps glance from the red object to another red one which you're taking to be the paradigm of red & such like. On the other hand you just intently stare at the red thing.
In many | part of their uses the words | expressions ‘visual image’ & ‘picture’ run parallel but where … they don't the analogy which does exist tends to delude us.
Tautology
The grammar of ‘seeing red’ connected to the expression of seeing red closer than one thinks.
“You talk as though one couldn't|can't see a red patch if one doesn't | can't say
ड Ms-149,6v
that one does; as|As if seeing something was saying that one sees it”.
“Seeing something” of course doesn't mean the same as saying that one sees something but the senses of their expression are closer related than it might appear to you.
We say a blind man doesn't see anything. But not only do we say so but he too says that he does not see I don't mean “he agrees with us that he does not see”, “he does not dispute it”, but rather, he too describes the facts in this way having learnt the same language as we have. Now whom do we call blind, what is our criterion for blindness? A certain kind of behaviour. And if a | the person behaves in that particular way we not only call him blind but teach him to call himself blind. And in this sense his behaviour also determines the meaning of blindness for him. But now you will say: “Surely blindness isn't a behaviour; it's clear that a man can behave like a blind man & not be blind. Therefore ‘blindness’ means something different: this behaviour only helps him
ड Ms-149,7r
to understand what we mean by ‘blindness’. The outward circumstances are what both I we and he know. Whenever he behaves in a certain way we say that he sees nothing & he notices that a certain private experience of his coincides with all these cases & thereby can|so concludes that we mean this experiences of his by saying that he sees nothing….
The idea is that we teach a man | person the meaning of expressions relating to personal experiences indirectly.— Such an indirect mode of teaching we could imagine as follows. … We | I teach a child the names of colours & a game, say, of bringing objects of a certain colour when the ‘name of the colour’ is called out. I don't however teach him the colour-names by pointing to a sample which we & he see saying e.g. the word ‘red’. Instead I have various spectacles each of which when we | I look through it makes us | me see the white paper in a different colour. These spectacles are also distinguished by their
ड Ms-149,7v
outside appearance : the one that makes me see red has round | circular glasses the green | another one elliptical ones etc. We now teach the child in this way that when I see it putting the round | circular ones on his nose I say the word ‘red’, when the elliptical ones ‘ green’ & so forth? This one might call reacting the child the meanings of the colour names in an indirect way because I | one could here|in this case say that I led the child to correlate the word red with something that I didn't see but hoped the child would see if it looked through the circular glasses. And this way is indirect as opposed to the direct way of pointing to a red object etc..
[mind-reading]
From this it should follow that we sometimes rightly sometimes wrongly teach a man to say that he is blind : For what if he saw all the time but nevertheless behaved exactly like a blind man?— Or should we say: “Nature wouldn't play such a trick on us !”.
We can see here that we don't quite
ड Ms-149,8r
understand the real use of the word | expression “to see something” or “to see nothing”. And what is so misleading to us when we consider this use is the following: We say “Surely we can see something without ever saying or showing that we do & on the other hand we can say that we see so & so without seeing it, therefore seeing is the process & expressing that we see another, & all they have to do with each other is that they sometimes coincide; they have the same connection as being red & being sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet “etc.”.
Now this is obviously not quite true & not quite false. It seems we somehow|that we look at the use of these words with some prejudice. It is clear that we in our language use the expression | words ‘seeing red’ in such a way that we can say “he sees …|A sees red, but doesn't show it” on the other hand it is easy to see that we would have no use for these words if their application was severed from the criteria of behaviour, that is to say, to the language game which we play with these words it is, both, essential that the people who play it (should) behave in the particular way we call expressing|saying, showing what
ड Ms-149,8v
they see, & also that they sometimes|under certain circumstances they should more or less or entirely conceal what they see.
Balance: The point of the game depends upon what usually happens.
Point of a game
⇆ How does he know that he sees|has the visual image red i.e. how does he connect the word ‘red’ with ‘ a particular colour’? In fact what does the expression ‘a particular’ here mean. What is the criterion for his connecting it|the word always to the same colour|experience? Is it not often just that he calls it red?
But doesn't then the word “seeing red” mean to me a particular process|certain (private) experience or (mental) <…>|fact in the realm of primary experience , | — which surely is utterly different from saying certain words?⇄
In fact if he is to play a languagegame the possibility of this will depend upon his own & the other people's reactions. The game depends upon the agreement of these reactions i.e. they must call | describe the same things ‘red’.
“But if he speaks to himself surely this is different. For then he needn't consult other people's reactions & he just gives the name ‘red’ to the same colour as that | to which he
ड Ms-149,9r
gave it on a previous occasion.|on previous occasions.|in previous cases. But how does he know that it is the same colour. Does he also recognize the sameness of colour as what he used to call sameness of colour & so on ad infinitum? It is quite true he uses | connects, in agreement with ordinary use, the word ‘red’ & the same colour such that he would not say that he saw how the colour he had seen before that that colour is red but that what he sees now is not red etc.
It is quite true, he connects the word & the experience.
The words “‘seeing red’ means a part experience” are useless unless we can follow them up by: ‘namely this → (pointing)’. Or else they may say experience as opposed to physical object, but then this is grammar.
But I could use language just for making entries in my diary & without even having learnt it I could have invented a name for the particular a colour sensation say the name ‘red’ & then used this name to write down whenever I had that
ड Ms-149,9v
colour sensation. That means, you (would) play a private language game with yourself. But let's see, how are we to describe this game?
When you say “the expression ‘---’ means to you a certain private experience” you are (indeed) supplementing this statement by imagining a red colour, or looking at a red object, (which supply the ‘ namely this’), but how do you use|make use of the expression & the experience you thus connect with it? For what we call the meaning of the word lies in the game we play with it.
But it seems to me that I either see red or don't see red. Whether I say | express it or not.
Picture we use here
This picture not questioned but its application.
Both cases of tautologies.
“Surely seeing is one thing, & showing that I see is another thing”.— This certainly is like saying “skipping is one thing &
ड Ms-149,10r
jumping another”. But there is a supplement to this statement “skipping is this (showing it) & jumping this (showing it)”. Now how about this supplement in the first case? “Seeing red is this (showing it) & showing that we see red, this (showing it)” The point is just that there isn't a ‘showing that I see’ except … showing that I see. “But can't I say: seeing red is what I'm doing now” (looking at something red)? And although in a sense the other man can't directly see what I'm talking about, I certainly know that it is that I'm talking about. That is although for him I can't point directly to the my seeing red, for myself I can point to it, & in this sense I can give an ostensive definition of the expression to myself. ← But an ostensive definition is not a magic act .
If I explain to someone to | the use of --- by. Giving the ostensive definition simply consists in ---.
One might be inclined to say that castling was not just the act of ….
But it is the game of which it is part….
So what does giving to myself the ostensive definition of red consist in? I suppose we should say I suppose looking | —Now how am I to describe it shall I say seeing red &
ड Ms-149,10v
saying to myself that I do. | ‘this is red.’ | ‘or I see red.’— … Or is it “seeing a certain colour sensation & saying ‘I see red’”? The first version it seems doesn't account for that fact|won't do as it isn't essential to us that when I do for myself what I call ‘seeing red’ that should necessarily be what the others understand | mean by seeing red. So I would rather leave it open what colour I am concentrating my attention on. But then how can I call it a colour? Isn't it just as uncertain that I mean by colour what he means as that I mean by red what they mean & the same of course holds for | applies to ‘seeing’ (for what here I mean by the word is not an activity of the human eye). (The second version is justified only if I wish to say that it does not matter here to which of the colours (say, red, green, blue, yellow) he gives | he assigns the name ‘red’ & so we might have said “he sees a same colour, say, blue & says ‘I see red.’”.)
But it's a blatant error to mix up ‘seeing red’ with showing that you see red! I know what seeing red is & I know what showing … is. Couldn't we say that knowing what showing … is, is seeing?
ड Ms-149,11r
Consider the proposition: He makes sure what it means to him by …. Would you say the word had meaning to him if it ‘meant something else’ even time? And what is the criterion of the same colour coming twice. showing now what is knowing what seeing is .
In knowing what seeing red is you seem to give yourself a sample | you say to yourself ‘seeing red is this’ but you don't because the usual criteria for the sameness of the sample don't apply. I can say I call ‘red’ always the same colour or whenever I explain red I point to a sample of the same colour.
If we describe a game which he plays with himself is it relevant that he should use the word red for the same colour in our sense or would we also call it a language game if he used it anyhow. Then what is the criterion for using it in the same way? Not merely the connection between ‘same’, ’colour’ & ‘red’?
Which is the same colour as that I saw? Not the one to which I apply the words ‘this is the same colour ’?
“Let me see if I still know which of these colours is red? — looking about Yes I know.” (Here I could have said “is called red”)
So he can make sure of what it means in this private way‘!|in this private way of what it means by having a private sensation Making sure that you know what ‘seeing
ड Ms-149,11v
red’ means is good only if you can make use of this knowledge in a future case. Now what if I see a colour again, can I say I made sure I knew what ‘red’ was|meant so now I shall know that I'll recognize it correctly? In what sense is having said the words ‘this is red’ before a guarantee that I now see the same colour when I say again I see red?
We can indeed imagine a Robinson using a language for himself but then he must behave in a certain way or we shouldn't say that he plays language games with himself.
The grammar of ‘private sense data’
Das Interessante ist nicht daß ich nicht auf mein Benehmen achten muß um zu wissen, daß ich Zahnschmerzen habe, sondern, daß mir mein Benehmen gar nichts sagt.
ड Ms-149,12r
“I sent him to the doctor because he moans” is just as correct as “I sent him to the doctor because he has toothache”.
“I moan because I have pain”.— Are you sure that that's why you moan?
“But damn all the nucleus of our language remains untouched whatever we might imagine our behaviour to be!” The nucleus is the word & | together with it's meaning.
“‘Toothache’ is a word which I use in a game which I play with other people, but it has a private meaning to me.”
“Christen toothache”
Changing the meaning of a word. Meaning connected with the use of the ostensive definition.
In the use of the word meaning it is essential
ड Ms-149,12v
that the same meaning is kept throughout a game.
Consider a game in which this isn't so. Would you call this sort of activity a game?
“Are you sure that you call ‘toothache’ always the same private experience?”
‘I recognize it as being the same’. And are you also recognizing the meaning of the word as the same, so you can be sure that “recognizing it to be the same” now means the same to you which it did before?
“But in ostensively defining a word for myself I impress it's meaning on me so as not to forget it later on”. But how do you know that this helps. How do you know later on whether you remember it rightly or wrongly.
Can you recognize something to be red which isn't red?
To be sure that so & so is the case. To know: Does ‘p’ follow from ‘I know p’?
ड Ms-149,13r
The normal case of being sure, of a strong conviction.
Does it make sense to say, that what you see is green, & you recognize it to be red?
“It seems to me to have sense”.
You are undoubtedly using a picture therefore it ‘seems to you to make | have sense’. But ask yourself what use you are making of that picture? We shall have to talk about sense & nonsense later.
What's the use here of being sure if it doesn't follow that it is so & if your being sure is the only criterion there is to | for it being so?
That means: This isn't at all a case of being sure, of conviction.
The word ‘recognizing as …’ is used where you can be wrong in recognizing.
—Sometimes these bodies change their weight & then we look for the cause (of it)|of the change & find , say, that something's come off the body.
ड Ms-149,13v
Sometimes however the weight of a body changes & we can't account for it | the change at all. But we nevertheless don't say that weighing it had lost its point “because now the body really doesn't have any one weight”. Rather we say that the body had changed somehow that this was the cause of the change of weight but that hitherto we are not | have not found this cause. That is, we shall|will go on playing the game of weighing & | we try to find an explanation for the exceptional behaviour.
We talk of | use the formal expression “the weight of a|this body” to designate something inherent in the body something which could only be demolished by destroying part of the body. The same body — the same weight. (And this is a grammatical proposition )
Green.
Supposing what in fact is the rule became the exception. Under certain peculiar circumstances indeed a body kept on weighing the same. Say iron in the presence of mercury. Must a piece of cheese on the other hand though keeping its size, calories weigh
ड Ms-149,14r
different weights at different times unaccountably.
…
On the one hand it seems that if there wasn't the behaviour of it.
“So & so has excellent teeth, he never had to go to the dentist, never complained about toothache; but as toothache is a private experience we can't know whether he hasn't had terrible toothache all his life”.
⇆
What is an assumption that e.g. ‘A has toothache’? Is it saying the words “A has toothache”? Or doesn't it consist in doing …|something with these words? How does one assume such & such to be the case?⇄
A game of assumption: ---
Assuming: a state of mind. Assuming: a gesture.
“But the point is just that we don't assume that we have toothache. Therefore even if we have no ground for assuming that anyone else has toothache we may nevertheless know that we have.” But would we in this case at all talk of a
ड Ms-149,14v
(particular) behaviour as a symptom of pains? “Suppose no one knew pains except I, & I just invented a name ‘abracadabra’ for it!”
Showing his grief, —hiding his grief.
Certain behaviour under certain circumstances we call showing our toothache other behaviour, hiding our toothache. Now would we talk about this behaviour in this way if people didn't ordinarily behave in the way they do? Suppose I & they described my behaviour without such a word as pain, would the description be incomplete? The question is : do I consider it incomplete? If so I will distinguish between two cases of my behaviour & the others will say that I use two words alternately for my behaviour & thereby they will acknowledge that I have toothache.
“But can't he have toothache without in any way showing it? And this shows that the word ‘toothache’ has a meaning entirely independent of a behaviour connected with toothache.”
ड Ms-149,15r
“The game which we play with the word ‘toothache’ entirely depends upon there being a behaviour which we call the expression of toothache.
“We use ‘toothache’ as the name of a personal experience”.— Well let's see how we use the word!
“But you know the sensation of toothache! So you can give it a name, say, ‘toothache’.”
But what is it like to give a sensation a name? Say it is pronouncing the name while one has the sensation & possibly concentrating on the sensation, — but what of it? Does this name thereby get magic powers? And why on earth do I call these sounds the ‘name’ of the sensation? I know what I do with the name of a man or of a number but have I by this act of ‘definition’ given the name a use?
“I know what toothache is”. But how do I know that I know it? Because something comes before my mind? But|And how do I know that that is the right
ड Ms-149,15v
thing? Because I recognize it? But then it doesn't matter what it is, as long as I recognize it as toothache! …
“But when you ask me “do you know what toothache is” I answer yes after having brought before my mind a certain sensation.” But now is this certain sensation characterised? Only by that that it comes when you say the word ‘toothache ’? Or that it comes & you are in some way satisfied?
“To give a sensation a name” means nothing unless I know already in what sort of a game this name is to be used.
I've described certain behaviour by: ‘it is obvious that he was hiding his pain’ or: ‘I think he was hiding his pain’ or ‘I don't know at all whether he was hiding pain’.
But can't I just assume with some degree of certainty that he has
ड Ms-149,16r
to any part use of the word
pain although I have no reason whatever for it? I can say “I assume…”, but if I sent them all to the doctor although they showed no sign of illness|pain, I should just be called mad.
That we try to account for something is due to the fact that we often can account for it. If I saw no regularity whatever I should not be inclined to assume | say that there is one which I haven't or yet discovered. What usually happens makes me take this point of view.
The ‘private definition’ is not binding.
In our private language game we had, it seemed, given a name to an impression, — in order, of course, to use it | the name for this impression in the future. The def., that is, should have determined on future occasions for what impressions to use the word ‘red’ | name & for which not to use it. Now we said that on certain occasions we were inclined | we didn't after having given the def. we used the word on others ; but we described these
ड Ms-149,16v
occasions only by saying that we had ‘certain impressions’ that is we didn't describe them at all. The only thing that characterized them was that we used such & such words. What seemed … to be a definition didn't play the role of a def. at all, it did not justify one subsequent use of the word and all that remains of our | your | one's private language game is therefore that I|you sometimes without justifying my particular reason write a word | the word ‘red’ into my diary — without any justification whatever.
“But surely I feel justified when normally I use the word ‘red’ although I don't think of a def. while doing ‘so’. Do you mean that whenever normally you use the word ‘red’ you have a particular feeling which you call a feeling of justification. I wonder if that is true. But true or not| anyhow by ‘justification’ I didn't mean a feeling. But I think I know what makes you say that or saying e.g. this chair|book is red you have a feeling of being justified in using the word. For you might ask: is there there an obvious difference
ड Ms-149,17r
between the case in which I use | apply|use a word in its well known meaning|as when I say <…> to someone ’the sky is blue today‘ & the case in which I apply | say any arbitrary word or such an occasion e.g. ’the sky is moo‘. In this case, you will say, I either know that I am just fixing | giving a meaning to the word ’moo‘ or else I shall feel that I have no justification whatever to use|there is no justification whatever for using the word. The word is just any word & not the appropriate word. I quite agree that there is a difference in experience between the cases of ’using the name of the colour’, ’giving a new name to the colour’ & ‘using any | some arbitrary word in the place of the name of the colour’. But that doesn't mean that it is correct to say that I have a feeling of appropriateness in the first case which is absent in the third. “But ‘red’ somehow seems to us to fit this colour”. We certainly may be inclined to say this sentence of certain but it would be wrong to say that therefore we had a feeling of fitting when ordinarily we said that something was red.
“But do you mean that one man couldn't play a game of chess with himself &
ड Ms-149,17v
without anyone else knowing that he did?— What, would you say, he should do in order that we may say he is playing| to be playing with himself a private game of chess? Just anything?— Would you say he must go through certain private experiences which I can indirectly describe by saying that they are the experiences which he has when playing a certain game chess (in the ordinary sense of the word)? I suppose you would say e.g. that he imagines a chessboard with the chessmen on it, then | that he imagines certain moves etc.. And on being | if you were asked what it means to imagine a chessboard, you would explain it by pointing to a real chessboard or, the | say to a picture of one and analogously if you were asked what does it mean to imagine cast…ling etc. | the king of chess, a pawn, a knight's mo…ve etc.. Or should you have said: He must go through certain …. But what private experiences are there & will any of them do in this case? For
ड Ms-149,18r
instance feeling hot?. But you don't understand me.| No. | “No!” The private experience I am talking of must have the multiplicity of the game of chess: But remember what we have said of | again does he recognize two private experiences to be different by a further private experience & this to be the
[private experiences in fiction.]
same in the different cases? Mustn't we say in this case that we can't say anything whatever about private experiences & are in fact not entitled to use the words experiences at all? What makes us believe that … we are in, that we really think of the case in which we can describe his private experiences describing different kind | ways of playing chess in one's imagination.
How can we say he may see red although nobody may be able to find it out?
If we go through with this idea of the|a private experience which we don't know we can't talk of a certain private experience either, because
ड Ms-149,18v
this expression is taken from the case in which what we don't know is say, whether if he says he uses red he sees red & not perhaps blue green or yellow.
in which it attends to a certain class of experiences which we know though we don't know which one of it's members he has. Rather the private experiences|impressions which we imagine as the background to the foreground of our actions dissolve… into a mist which we wished to talk about & imagined to be back of our action dissolve into a mist …
Rather the private experiences which we imagined as an unknown x , y, z etc. behind our actions, dissolve into a mist & into nothing.
One might suggest—: The word ‘toothache’ on the one hand for a behaviour & on the other hand for a private experience. The connection is that when a man has the private experience he tends to behave in the particular way.
ड Ms-149,19r
But why should you talk of a private experience & not 100 private experiences, as you don't know whether there is any red or whether there are 100?
What is so confusing here is to talk of the meaning of the word instead of of the use.
The idea of different kinds of objects.
Why should you know better what experiencing is like with the other person than what seeing red is like?
If you were very careful you would say “a certain … something”.
What does it consist in | is happening | is it that happens when in one case I say “I have toothache|see red & mean it, am not lying, & on the other hand I say the words but know that they are not true, or say them not knowing what exactly they mean etc.?
The criteria for it being the truth have to be laid down beforehand in common language|are laid down in language (rules, charts etc.). “But how am I to know how in the particular case to apply them?— For ||For, being laid down…| For in so far as they
ड Ms-149,19v
are laid down in common language they join the rest of what is thus laid down|are|become just part of the common language game i.e. they don't help me in any particular case. They join in with all the rest of … not helping me|& don't help me in my particular private decision.
| They join the rest of the rules of common language .
Is there such a thing as justifying what in the particular case I do just by what then further is the case an not by rule? Can I say : I am now justified in using the sentence just by what is now the case…?
No!
Nor can I say|does it help me to say I am justified “when I feel justified”. For about feeling justified the same things can be said as about feeling toothache.
My criteria for having toothache are the same as| saying I have toothache is no other than for the others saying I have toothache, for I can't say that feeling, or having, toothache is my criterion for having a right to say it.
Examine: ‘These two operations bring about the same pain’. The pain which they all bring about I shall call toothache.
What does this shew?? Now I might explain Did I give the name ‘toothache’ to a behaviour ? Did I call a behaviour “having toothache”? Did I call a behaviour “having the same pain”? But showing toothache can never be saying
Ich glaube ich wollte zeigen, daß ‘toothache’ hier nicht als Name eines Benehmens gegeben wird & daß man auch nicht auf eine Erfahrung hinten dem Benehmen zeigt.
I must assume an expression which is not lying.
Now do I say that there is
ड Ms-149,20r
not the experience of toothache but only the behaviour ?!?
When I say that moaning is the expression of toothache then under certain circumstances the possibility of it being the expression without the feeling behind it mustn't enter my game.
Es ist Unsinn zu sagen: der Ausdruck kann immer lügen .
The language games with expressions of feelings (private experiences) are based on games with expressions of which we don't say that they may lie.
“But was I when a baby taught that toothache meant my expression of toothache?”— I was told that a certain behaviour was called expression of toothache.
“But isn't it possible that a child should behave just as a normal child when it has toothache & not have toothache?”
ड Ms-149,20v
But does if we speak of the baby, ‘having toothache’ mean the same as ‘behaving such & such’?
We say “poor thing, it moans”.
“Can't I in the child too, separate the moaning from the pain. Can't I say that I pity it because it has pain not because it moans?
You ought I suppose to say what you pity it because you believe that it has pains. But what is believing that it has pains like, as opposed to believing|just seeing that it moans? It doesn't here consist in believing that he doesn't check toothache but in a different experience.
“Something clicked in my brain|mind when I came to this colour”. (This is a gesture) But did you know from the clicking that it was red. Supposing looking at this colour your eyes opened wider & you gave a jerk, — was it by its producing this reaction that you recognized
ड Ms-149,21r
the colour is being red? I saw a particular colour concentrated on it & the word red came without tension. Indeed this is the phenomenon we call recognition but we call it that because it happens under circumstances where we have other criteria for saying that we've recognized the object.
“But surely there is a case in which I'm justified to say “I see red”, where I'm not lying, & one where I'm not justified in saying this | so!” Of course I can be justified by the ostensive def. or by asking the others “now isn't this red?” & they answer that it is. But you didn't mean this justification, but one that|which justifies me privately whatever others will say.
“But do you mean to say that the truth or falsehood of my saying ‘I see red’ does not consist in there being red before my mind's eye in one case & not in the other; but that it depends on such things as ⌇ emph whether I say it in this or that tone of voice| with a certain tension or without?” ⌇ emph
ड Ms-149,21v
If I say “I see red” without reason, how can I distinguish between saying it with truth & saying it as a lie?
It is important here that that I exclude the case|that there is no case there is no such case as of saying the untruth by mistake.
Hier haben wir keinen Vergleich des Satzes mit der Wirklichkeit! (Kollationen)
Don't I know, when I say “I see red” & am lying, that I am lying?— When do I translate my experience into the words expressing my knowledge? One might say: knowing that I am lying doesn't mean saying that I do but being ready to say it.
I could say: Lying is characterised by a peculiar|an experience of tension. What is it like to know that I don't see red & to say that I do?
“Well it is simply not seeing red & saying “I see red”! There is nothing
ड Ms-149,22r
problematic about|in this, as seeing & saying something are utterly independent.”
“What I now call …”
[We never dispute the opinions of common sense but we question the expression of common sense]
Suppose I said “I see red” & was lying for I actually saw red — but had made a slip of the tongue.
But which lie was it I had said, or (rather) thought? Of course I may say later “I wanted to say “I see green” but did anything correspond to these words while I said “I see red”?”
But suppose that he felt that he was lying but never said so, — did he know that he was lying or not?
“Did he know that he was doing, what we call lying?” “Did he know that he was doing what on other occasions he called lying?”
What is his criterion for saying
ड Ms-149,22v
— wanting to speak the truth, — that he is|was lying? Is there a criterion?
Do|Are these two sentences to say the same : “He says he sees red & really sees red” & he says he sees red with conviction|and has the experience of not lying?
“So you think seeing red consists in saying ‘I see red’ in a certain tone of voice?”— No, but saying “I see red” & seeing it might be saying it in a particular tone of voice.
How do I imagine myself seeing red? Isn't it by imagining red?! But how do I imagine myself addressing a meeting?
Imagine a Robinson lying to himself.— Why is this difficult to imagine?
Look at something red & say to yourself “I see green” a) meaning by ‘green’ what usually you mean by ‘red’ (i.e. speaking the truth) b) lying.
ड Ms-149,23r
But one might call it lying to oneself if one e.g. turns one's watch forward to make oneself get up earlier.
Falsifying an account. I add up numbers arrive at 2730 then rub out 3 & put a 5 instead.
When in this <…> we talk of lying it ought always to mean subjectively lying & subjectively lying to the other person & not to oneself.
If I see green without saying I see green , in what way can these words be said to describe what I see?
One could imagine someone constantly lying subjectively but not objectively.
Imagine this case: Someone has a particular way if lying, he… He always lies calling red ‘green’ & green ‘red’, but as a matter of fact what he says agrees with the usage of the other people & so his lying is never noticed. //taken notice of.//
ड Ms-149,23v
Supposing one said: To see red means to see that which makes me inclined to describe it by saying ‘…’.
“To know that I am lying means to have that | an experience which I should describe by the words ‘…’.”
[Our language on the one hand has very much more possibilities of expression than logicians admit|dream of|imagine & on the other hand the uses of it's|these modes of expression are very much more limited than logicians|they imagine.]
What makes lying “I see red” into lying? The subjective | private experience of not seeing red or the private experience of feeling a certain tension?
Is it wrong to say that lying in such & such cases consists in saying so & so & feeling a tension?
Man könnte sehr wohl sagen daß manchmal die Lüge dadurch charakterisiert ist daß ich mir bewußt bin daß es sich anderes
ड Ms-149,24r
verhält, & manchmal nicht so, sondern dadurch, daß ich die Spannung des schlechten Gewissens spüre; etc..
Wenn ich nun sage “der lügt, der sagt ‘ich sehe rot’ & sieht grün”, so stimmt das nicht, denn ich mußte sagen “der lügt der sagt ‘ich sehe rot’ & weißt (oder glaubt) er sieht grün”.
“Der lügt, der sagt “ich sehe rot” & sieht die Farbe, die er selbst mit dem Worte grün bezeichnen würde.” Aber das heißt doch wahrheitsgemäß so bezeichnen würde. Oder können wir sagen, “für sich so bezeichnen würde”?
Daher ja die Idee daß man lügen kann sondern man laut das eine & leise das andre sagt & was man laut sagt ist hier die Lüge.
“Der weiß, welche Farbe er sieht, der es irgendwie ausdrücken könnte.” Was ist das Kriterium dafür daß, er das | es könnte?
Was soll es dann heißen : einer Farbeneindruck wahrheitsgemäß mit ‘rot’ bezeichnen? Paßt das Wort dem einen Eindruck besser als dem anderen?
ड Ms-149,24v
Man könnte hier auch sagen man solle gar nicht von subjektiver Wahrheit der Farben sprechen. Die Wahrheit des Satzes “Ich habe Zahnschmerzen” habe nur objektiv beurteilt zu werden.
“Das Wahre Wort kommt anders als das falsche.”
Man kann sagen: “Alle diese Worte sind in derselben Weise gekommen.”
Das Wort welches Du sprichst ist eine Reaktion. Die Reaktion die wir in dem Satz übersehen “er sieht …”.— Aber ist es nicht wahr daß der Andere nicht wissen braucht, daß meine Reaktion in dieser & dieser Weise vor sich geht? Er meint, ich sage ihm geradeheraus was ich sehe & es ist nicht so, sondern ich erfinde eine Lüge.
“Er weiß nicht was ich sehe, bis ich es ihm sage; ich weiß es schon vorher // ehe er es erfährt//.” Könnte es auch umgekehrt sein?
ड Ms-149,25r
Ich habe jetzt lange mit einem Bleistift geschrieben : wußte ich in diesem Satz daß die Schrift grau & das Papier weiß ist?
Wußte ich das,|? oder wußte ich bloß, daß es ist wie es ist?
“Ich weiß, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe.”— “Ja, aber war nicht vor dieser ‘Reaktion’ schon etwas da, näm lich eben das Erlebnis, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe?”
“Können wir nicht doch sagen, daß etwas jedem sichtbar (äußerlich), geschah|geschieht & etwas weiteres nur mir wahrnehmbar|erkennbar, ‘in mir’?”
“How am I justified in saying that I see this apple red”. You are not justified.— But isn't it true that when I say the truth I am justified & when I'm lying I'm not justified.
How is a lie possible in a case where there is no justification?
Supposing one said, lying (here) consists in applying one word to the colour
ड Ms-149,25v
& not another? A misleading word instead of a not misleading one?
I am justified if the word comes in one way, & not justified if it comes in an other way. —But in which way?— If it comes in the straightforward way I'm justified But which is the straightforward way?— I know but can't explain as the paradigm of it is in me.— But as far as it's in you it serves no purpose in the future application of the word. (private ostensive def.)
How do I know that it comes in the straightforward way? What the straightforward way is must be fixed by a paradigm.
“Why on earth should it be wrong to use a word not in the simple (‘straightforward’) way?” Couldn't it not even be my duty to use the word which doesn't come straightforwardly? Imagine the case where we had laid down a code in which ‘red’ meant green.
ड Ms-149,26r
“I said the word with a bad conscience.”
What troubles me are the propositions in which an action is described accompanied by a ‘state of mind’.
“Lying when you say “I see red” consists in saying these words & having a private experience which I call ‘feeling unjustified ’, or ‘seeing green’ etc.”— “But suppose that I call the feeling of being justified “feeling unjustified”!?”— This|Nor this last sentence though it sounds absurd had sense.
“What you say comes to this: when you | I truly say ‘I see red’ you are | I am not justified in saying this by the | a fact that you | I see red”.— No I should say ---
“You either have a feeling of being unjustified or you don't!”
ड Ms-149,26v
“But surely there is a case in which I say ‘I see red’ & am telling the (subjective) truth & one in which I lie!”— Yes, that is, we distinguish between telling the|a case of telling the truth & not telling| of not telling the truth.— But what does lying in this|such a case, consist in? We may try all sorts of explanations: “It consists in saying … & seeing green”, “It consists in saying … & knowing that I see …”, “It consists in saying … & feeling that I'm not justified in saying this” & others. Now let me ask : do all these explanations come to the same or do they describe different facts? We might||can say : if they describe different cases|facts the differences are quite unimportant to us (here)|don't matter to us here. For our purpose they can all be said to describe the same fact|case. (We might have said lying consists in saying “I see red” & having stomach ache but as stomach ache is a private sensation why not rather consider the private sensation of seeing a colour other than red?) We may say therefore that these explanations for our purpose were no explanations at all. They left us just
ड Ms-149,27r
where we were , and they only (seem) (so) confirm|affirm say that the cases of lying & saying the truth are distinguished by the private experience accompanying the sentence. So let us put our questions like this: lying or our case consists in saying “I see red” & seeing green ,|: What does seeing green consist in? As an answer we immediately give ourselves a sample of green| ‘for green’. But is it essential that this sample should be what the others also call green? No it might be what they call yellow or blue or red etc.. But are you inclined to say “it might be what they call hot, cold or <…>”? Then after all you are thinking of games played with others though you left a certain latitude ….
When we talk of the private experience which the others don't know we don't originally mean to talk of a shapeless nothing but of a variable with certain definite value.
It is said sometimes that if I & someone else are looking at some objects I can never know what colours the other really sees. But with what
ड Ms-149,27v
right do we here speak of | use ‘colour’ & seeing? Some philosophers (e.g. Driesch) would here be inclined to think that they can solve the puzzle|save the situation by using the senseless phrase “We can't know what the other have”. Compare Driesch :
…. But as long as ‘to have’ here have any meaning at all it can't help us & when it has no meaning at all I think it can't help us either.
“We distinguish between … & …“ that means : We sometimes use the expression “I lied when I said that I saw green” sometimes | as opposed to “I told the truth when I said ‘…’”. But isn't this enough?— “But under what circumstances do you use the expression ‘…’”? But must I necessarily stop giving you circumstances when I have given you a sample? Why not when I have given you a word, a verbal expression? Is the use of such an expression necessarily indefinite as compared
ड Ms-149,28r
with the use of a sample — can't a sample be used, compared with objects, in many different ways?
The word lying is taught us in a particular way in which it was fastened to a certain behaviour to the use of a certain expression under certain circumstances. Then we use it saying that we have been lying when our behaviour was not like the one which first constituted the meaning.
Isn't in the same way we were thought the word ‘red’ in a game say like number one & then we use it when the conditions are different (compare the past in the description of a dream) (end of course it isn't just the word ‘red’ we use but the whole imagery connected with it)
“But you talk as though there was only the word ‘red’| expression ‘I see red’ but not an impression corresponding to it. On the contrary I don't say that when a man says … he also has the impression
ड Ms-149,28v
But is all that happens that you say ‘I see red’? Isn't there something else being the case, happening, when you say this & it is true? But if you ask isn't there something else happening, you don't mean just anything else e.g. that it's raining. So after all you have to give descriptions of what it is that happens| you mean is happening & insofar as you give a description of it you must know what it is that happens & it is not an | the x. And keeping it partly unknown doesn't help you either. On the other hand there is no reason why you should always stop with giving a sample & not with giving a word|an expression. (in this sense one can say that an expression acts as a picture)| as much as a picture as a sample)
The philosophical puzzle seems insoluble if we are frank to | with ourselves, & is, insoluble. That is until that is we change our question.
‘Expression ‘can always be lying’… How can we say this of the expression to which
ड Ms-149,29r
we fasten our words?
“But I always know whether I'm lying or not!” — you are first | now obsessed with the word | the use of the word ‘lying’. As a rule|In general you talk without thinking of lying & of whether you lie or not.
But (then) I'm always either lying or not lying! (Whether I always know it or not)
Suppose a child learnt the word ‘toothache’ as an equivalent for it…s moaning & noticed that whenever it said the word or moaned the grown-ups treated it particularly well. The child then uses moaning or the word ‘toothache’ as a means to bring about the desired effect : is the child lying?
You say : “Surely I can moan with toothache & I can moan without toothache, so why shouldn't it be so with the child? Of course I only see
ड Ms-149,29v
& hear the child's behaviour but from my own experience I know what toothache is (like) // I know toothache apart from behaviour// & I am led to believe that the others sometimes have the pains I have”.— The first sentence already is misleading : It isn't the question whether I can moan with & without toothache, the point is that I distinguish ‘moaning with toothache’ & ‘moaning without toothache’ & now we can't go on to say that of course in the child we make the same distinction. In fact we don't. We teach the child to use the words “I have toothache” to replace its moans, & this was how I myself|too was taught the expression. How do I know that I have learnt the word toothache to mean what they wanted me to express? I ought to say I believe I have toothache?
Now one can moan because one has pain, or e.g., one can moan on the stage. How do I know that the child, small as it is, doesn't already act & in this case I teach it to mean by ‘toothache’ something I don't want | intend it to mean?
I have taught the child to use the expression ‘I have toothache’
ड Ms-149,30r
under certain circumstances and now it uses the words under these circumstances.— But what are these circumstances? Shall we | I say | answer “the circumstances under which it moaned”, and what are these?
But now I also teach the child to moan on the stage! That is to say I even teach him | it to use this expression in a different game. I also teach it to read out the sentence ‘I have toothache’ out | from a book, when it hasn't toothache.
In fact I could teach it to lie, as a separate language game. (In fact we often play this kind of game with children)
“But doesn't what you say come to this that it doesn't matter what the persons feel as long as only they behave a particular way?”
“Do you mean that you can define pain in terms of behaviour?”
But is this what we do if we teach the child to use the expression ‘I have toothache’? Did I say|define : “Toothache is such & such a behaviour”? This would obviously be against| This obviously contradicts the normal use of the word! “But can't you, on the other hand,
ड Ms-149,30v
at least to yourself give an ostensive def. of ‘toothache’.” Pointing to the place of your pain & say “this is …”? “Can't I give a name to the pain I've got? Queer idea to give one pain a name! What's it do do with a name? Or what do I do with it? What I do with the name of a person whom I call by the name. I mean to say: What connection is the name to have with the pain. So far the only connection so far is this that you had toothache pointed to your cheek & said|pronounced the word ‘moo’. “So what?” Remember what we said about private ostensive definition.
“But aren't you neglecting something — the experience or whatever you might call it —? Almost the world behind the mere words?”
But here solipsism teaches | can teach us a lesson; It is the thought which is|It is that thought which is on the way to destroy this wrong idea. | error. For if the world is idea it isn't any person's idea. (Solipsism stops short of saying this & says that it is my idea). But then how could
ड Ms-149,31r
I say what the world was | is if the realm of ideas has no neighbour. What I do comes to defining the word world.
‘I neglect that which goes without saying.’
“What is seen I see” (pointing to my body) I point at my visual | geometrical eye, saying this. Or I point with closed eyes & touch my breast & feel it. In no case do I make a connection between what is seen & a person.
Back to ‘neglecting’! It seems that I neglect life. But not life physiologically understood but life as consciousness. And consciousness not physiologically understood; or, understood from the outside, but consciousness as the very essence of experience, & the appearance of the world, the world.
Couldn't I say : if I had to add the world to my language it would have to be one sign for the whole of language which sign could therefore be left out.
ड Ms-149,31v
Isn't what you reproach me of as though you said: “In your language you're only speaking !” ⇄
How am I to describe the way the child learns the word ‘toothache’ — like this? The child sometimes has toothache it moans & holds its cheek, the grown-ups say “…” etc.. Or : The child sometimes moans & holds its cheek, — the grown— ups “…”? Does the first description say something superfluous or false or does the second leave out something essential? Both descriptions are correct.
“But it seems as if you were neglecting something.” But what more can I do than distinguish the cases of saying ‘I have toothache’ when I really have toothache, & the case of saying the words without having the toothache?
I am also|further ready to talk of any x behind my words so long as it keeps its identity.
⇆
---But why should I say “I have toothache in his tooth”. I would insist on his tooth being extracted. Who
ड Ms-149,32r
is supposed to cry out if it is?
What does it mean distributing primary experience over all subjects? Imagine that they have all real toothaches in their teeth. The one which now only have. I now describe certain facts. (Not metaphysical ones but facts about the connection|coincidence of certain experiences.)
He gets a blow & cries,— I think: “no wonder for it really hurts”. But wouldn't I say to myself : Queer that he cries for I feel the pain all right,— but he?!
What does it consist in that I have pain, I feel myself crying, I hear that I am crying, my mouth cries?
It seems there is a phenomenon which in general I refer to as ‘my toothache’ which, experience teaches me, is always connected with one particular person (not ‘I’ but) Ludwig Wittgenstein. I now imagine facts other than they are & connect up this phenomenon to all sorts of persons so as to make it not at all tempting to call this phenomenon ‘my toothache’.
ड Ms-149,32v
Isn't it a particular phenomenon to hear myself speak (not, ‘to hear Ludwig Wittgenstein speak’). ---
“I see so & so” does not mean “The person so & so e.g. L.W. sees so & so”.
A language game in which everybody calls out what he sees but without saying “I see …”. Could anybody say that what I call out is incomplete because I have left out to mention the person?!
A language game in which everybody (& I too) call out what I see without mentioning me.
The always know what I see. If they don't seem to, I misunderstand what they say.
I am tempted to say: “It seems at least a fact of experience that at the source of the visual field there is mostly a small man with gray flannel trousers in fact L.W. .”— Someone might answer me to this: It is true
ड Ms-149,33r
you almost always wear gray flannel trousers & often look at them.
“Ich bin doch bevorzugt. Ich bin der Mittelpunkt der Welt.” Denken wir uns ich sähe mich in einem Spiegel das sagen & auf mich zeigen! Wäre es noch richtig?
When I say that I play a unique role I really mean the geometrical eye.
On the other hand if I describe the usual appearance of my body around the geometrical eye this is on the same level as saying that in the middle of the visual field there is in general a brown table & at the edges a white wall (as I generally sit in my room).
Now suppose I described this in the form : The visual world in general is like this :(follows the description). Would this be wrong?— Why should it be wrong?! But the question is, what game is to be played|I intend to be playing with this sentence, e.g., who is allowed to say it & what are the reactions to this statement|what the reactions to this statement are to be, // and how|in what way are the people who hear it| those to whom it is said to react // to
ड Ms-149,33v
to this statement|it //? I should like to say, that it's I who is to say it, not L.W., but th e person at the source of the visual field. But this I seem not to be able to explain to anyone but me.|anyone. (Queer state of affairs) The game played might be the one which is in general played with “I see so & so”.
Can't I say something to nobody, neither to anybody else nor to myself? What is the criterium of saying it to myself?
If I see a fire he runs to extinguish it.
At intervals I paint what I see. But can't someone else paint it for me? Or the picture be presented to me somehow, already finished?
What, if I see before me a picture of the room as I am seeing the room?
Is this a language game?
I want to say : “the visual world is like this …”,— but why say anything?
⇆
ड Ms-149,34r
// but why say anything?//
Der Solipsismus | // Die Auffassung des Solipsismus // erstreckt sich nicht auf Spiele. Der Andere kann so gut Schachspielen, wie ich | kann Schachspielen so gut wie ich.
I.e., when we play a language game we are on the same level.
“I am in the lucky position of being in the source of the visual world|field. It is I who see it.” I have a comfortable feeling while saying this although the statement isn't one of the class of statement which in general give me this kind of feeling. I said it as though I had said I am the wealthiest man in the place|have more money than anyone else.
But the point is that I don't establish a relation between a person & what is seen. All I do is that alternately I point in front of me & to myself.
⇄
But what I now see, this room|this view of my room, plays a unique role, it is the visual world!
(Der Solipsist flattert & flattert in der Fliegenglocke, schlägt sich an an den Wanden, flattert weiter.|stößt sich an den Wanden, flattert weiter. Wie ist er zur Ruhe zu
ड Ms-149,34v
bringen?)
“---|description : this is what I know see”. Leave out the “see”, leave out the “now”, the “this” & leave out the “I”.
“(Description) : this is the visual world”. But why do you say visual & why do you say that it's the world?
“A red patch is (now) at the center”. All others must say “I see …”. But is this distinction necessary, as I know anyhow who's saying it, whether I or one of the others?
But the real question for me is here : How am I defined? Who is it, that is favoured? I But may I lift up my head to indicate who it is?
— Supposing I constantly change & my surrounding does : is there still some continuity namely by it being me & my surrounding that were changing?! | change?!
(Isn't this similar to thinking that when things in space| spacial things have changed entirely there's still one thing that
ड Ms-149,35r
remains the same, namely space.) (Space confused with room)
But is my hand favoured as compared to someone else's hand I see? This is ridiculous. Then either nobody is favoured or I am, that is the person L.W. whose hand lifted.
All right, — when I, L.W., see what's seen!
Where is my toothache? I.e. how is its place determined?
“What I now see justifies me in saying that I see red”. And what do you now see? If the answer is “this” it is no answer I give to myself. |The answer may be “this” but you <…> answer I don't tell myself what it is I see.
I don't see what I see more definitely if at the same time I see my finger pointing to it. (The question <…> to have been what are you now looking at).
I don't tell myself what it is I see by looking at | seeing my finger pointing to something. Suppose I said : “What I now see justifies me in saying “I see red” because it is the same colour as this sample”,
ड Ms-149,35v
this is a justification only if I use the word | expression “the same colour” in a fixed way. That is when we judge how this word is used or the ordinary grounds of behaviour etc.
Is the criterion for my playing a private game of chess my being however strongly inclined to say that I am playing one ?
How does one feel whether I am strongly inclined?
What would I say if I in my private judgements came into contradiction with all other people. I.e. if I could not longer play a language game with them. Or if all the facts around me became extraordinary? Would I stick to my judgements?
Suppose someone asked me “What does it mean to play a private game of chess with oneself” & I answered : “Anything, because if I said that I was playing a game of chess I would be so
ड Ms-149,36r
convinced | sure that I was that I would stick to what I said whatever anyone else anyhow say.”
Under what circumstances would we say that he did what we call portraying & under what circumstances that he called something portraying which we didn't call that? Suppose here we said : Well I can never know what he does <…> would this be anything than resignation?
Suppose someone painted pictures of the landscape which surrounds it, he sometimes paints the leaves of trees orange sometimes blue, sometimes the clear sky red etc. Under what circumstances would we agree with him that he was portraying the landscape?
We call something a calculation if, for instance, it leads to a house being built.
⇆
But can't he play a game with the colournames against whatever anybody else says? But why should we call it a game with the colournames. “But if I played it I would stick to saying that I was playing a game with the colournames.” But is that all I can say about it; is all that I can say for its being this kind of game that I stick to calling it so?
↺ We call something a language game if it plays a particular role in our
ड Ms-149,36v
human life. ⇄
Under what circumstances would | do I say I am entitled to say that I'm seeing red. The answer is showing a sample i.e. giving the rule. But if now I came into obvious | constant contradiction with what anybody else said, should I not say that I am applying the rule in a way which prevents me from playing their game. That is : is all that is necessary that the rule I give should be the rule they give or isn't besides this an agreement in the application necessary?
If “he has the | having the same pain” means the same as “he says | saying that he | one has the same pain” then “I have the same pain” means the same as “I say that I have the same pain” & the exclamation ‘oh!’ means “I say ‘oh!’”.
Roughly speaking : The word | expression of | ’I have toothache‘ stands for a moan but it does not mean ’I moan’.
But if “I have toothache” stands for a
ड Ms-149,37r
moan, what does “he has toothache” stand for?
One might say : it too stands for a moan, that of compassion.
“toothache, seeing etc. I only know from myself & not from the other.”
“I never know that he has toothache, I only know when I have it.”
“I can only believe that he has it, that he has what I have.”
“Has ‘toothache’ then a different meaning in my case & in his?”
“Isn't it possible that everybody should have toothache but without expressing it?”
“If it is possible that sometimes one can have ‘toothache’ without expressing, it is possible that always this should be so.”
“If my personal experience is all I know how can I even assume that there is any other besides?”
“Does ‘toothache’ in the other mean behaviour?”
“I only know what I mean by ‘toothache’.”
“I was thinking the word ‘toothache’ in connection with my behaviour but interpreted it to mean my pain”.
“Only my ‘toothache’ is real toothache”.
“What justifies me in saying that the other has toothache in his behaviour, what justifies in saying that what I have is the experience of toothache.”
“Is there only the expression of toothache & not the toothache?”
ड Ms-149,37v
“I know what it means to say that the other has ‘toothache’ even if I have no means to find out whether he has.”
“Only he knows whether he has toothache, we can never know.”
“Does the I enter into the personal experience or not?”
•
are speaking the truth
We aren't lying if a fact corresponds to the sentence. This is no explanation at all but a mere repetition unless we can supplement it by ‘namely this↗’ & a demonstration & the whole explanation lies just in this demonstration. The whole problem here only arose through the fact that in this case the demonstration is of a different kind, indirect that the demonstration of ‘I see red’, ‘I have toothache’ seems ‘<…>’ • If say we must assume an expression which can't lie this can't be explained by saying, that really pain | pain really corresponds to this expression.
“But aren't you saying, that
ड Ms-149,38r
all that happens is the moaning & that there is nothing behind it?”—
I am saying that there is nothing behind the moaning.
“Do you deny that the moaning is the expression of something”. No, that is I too should call moaning a n expression (or even an expression of something though this is misleading). But the word expression here only characterizes the language game played with it. I react differently
“So, you don't really have pain, you just moan?!”— There seems to be a description of my behaviour & also, in the same sense a description of my experience my pain! The one so to speak the description of an external the other often internal fact. This correspond to the idea that in the sense in which I can give a part of my body a name. I can give a name to a private experience. (only indirectly)
And I am drawing your attention to this that the language games are
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very much more different than you think|it appears.
You couldn't call moaning a description! But this shows you how far the proposition “I have toothache” is from a ‘description’, & how far teaching the use of the word toothache is from teaching the word tooth.
One could from the beginning teach the child the expression “I think he has toothache” instead of “he has toothache” with the corresponding doubtful|uncertain tone of voice. This mode of expression could be described by saying that we can only believe that the owner has toothache.
But why not in the child's own case? Because there the tone of voice is simply determined by nature.
In “I have toothache” the expression of pain is brought to the same form as a description “I have a matchbox| used <…> 5 shillings”.
We teach the child to say “I have been lying” when it has behaved in a certain way. Imagine here a typical case of a lie Also this expression goes along with a
ड Ms-149,39r
particular situation, facial expressions, say of shame, tones of reproach etc.
But doesn't the child know that it is lying before ever I teach him the word|verbal expression? Is this a metaphysical question or a question about facts? It doesn't know it as words. And why should it know it at all?— “But do you assume that it has only the facial expression of shame, e.g., without the feeling of shame? Mustn't you describe the inside situation as well as the outside one?”— But what if I said that by facial expression of shame I meant what you mean by the facial expression & the feeling, unless I explicitly distinguish between genuine, & faked|simulated facial expressions? It is, I think, misleading to describe the genuine expression as a sum of the expression & something else, though it is just as misleading to say that the genuine expression is nothing but|besides a particular behaviour. | //is a particular behaviour & nothing besides.// We just mistake | misunderstand / get the function of our words|expressions // of language // if we|by //://
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We teach the child the use of the word “to speak”. =Later it uses the expression “I speak|spoke to myself”.= We then say “We never know whether & what a person speaks to himself”.
Surely the description of the facial expression can be meant (used)|is used as a description of feelings & can be meant|used otherwise. We constantly use such expressions as “When he heard that he made|pulled a long face” & don't add that the expression was genuine. In other cases we describe the acting of a person in the same words or again we wish to leave it open whether the question was genuine or not. To say that a description of expressions used as a description of feelings is indirect|we describe the feeling indirectly by the description of expressions is wrong!
Imagine a language in which toothache is called “moaning” & the difference between just moaning & moaning with pain is expressed by the moaning or dry tone in which the word is pronounced.
People would not say in this language that it became clear later on that
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A didn't really have pain, but they would perhaps in an angry tone say that at first he moaned & then he suddenly laughed.
Suppose he says to himself “ I lie”, how do we know whether he means it?|what is to show that he means it? But we should | would any day|time describe this lying by saying: “He said… & told himself at the same time that he was lying”. Is this too an indirect description of lying?
But couldn't one say that if I speak of a man's angry voice meaning that he was angry & again of his angry voice not meaning that he was angry in the first case the meaning of the description of his voice was much further reaching than in the second case? I will admit that our description in the first case doesn't admit anything & is as complete as though we had said that he really was angry,— but somehow the meaning of the expression then goes beyond | reaches below the surface.
But how does it do that? The answer to this would be an explanation of the use|two uses of the expression. But how could this explanation reach
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under the surface? It is an explanation about symbols | signs & it states in which cases these signs | symbols are used. But how does it characterize these|the cases? Can it in the end do more than distinguish two expressions? I.e. describe a game with two expressions?
“Then is there nothing under the surface?!” But I said that I was going to distinguish two expressions, one for the ‘surface’ & one for ‘what is below the surface’ only remember that these expressions themselves correspond to a picture, not to its usage. It is just as misleading to say that there is nothing but | just surface & nothing underneath it as that there is something below the surface & that there isn't just the surface. Because once we use|make use of the picture of the ‘surface’ it is most natural to use it such as to express the distinction as that between something on & something below the surface. | express with it the distinction as on & below the surface.
// Because we naturally use the|this picture to express the distinction as that between ‘on the surface’ & ‘below the surface’ // But we misapply the picture if we ask whether both cases are or aren't on the surface.
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Now in order that with its normal meaning we should teach a child the expression “I have lied” the child must behave in the normal way . E.g. it must under certain circumstances ‘admit’ that it lied, it must do so with a certain facial expression etc. etc. etc.. We may not always find out whether he lied or not but if we never found out the word would have a different meaning. “But once he has learnt the word he can't be in doubt whether he is lying or not!”— Consider the case of the person who finds that his subjective lies are jugded by the ordinary criteria, truths. He says that he has been to school feeling that it's a lie but the teacher the boys confirm that he has been etc. etc.. You might say: “But surely he can't doubt that he said a subjective lie”.
This of course is like saying that he can't be in doubt about whether he has toothache or whether he sees red etc. On the one hand : doubting whether I have the experience <…> is not like doubting whether someone else has it. Remember what we said about the asymmetry of the game No 1. On the other hand
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one can't say “surely I must know what it is I see” unless to know what I see is to mean to see whatever I see. The question is what are we to call “knowing what it is I see”, “not being in doubt about what it is I see”. Under what circumstances are we to say that a person is in no doubt or in doubt about this? (Such cases as being in no doubt about whether this looks red to the normal eye & analogous one of course don't interest us here.) I suppose that the knowledge of what it is I see must be the knowledge that it is so & so I see. ‘So & so’ standing for some expression verbal or otherwise. (But remember that I don't give myself an information by pointing to something I see with my finger & saying to myself I see this.) ‘So & so’ in fact stands for an expression|a word of a language game. And doubting what it is I see will be | is doubting what e.g. what to call what I see.
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Doubting e.g. whether to say “I see red” or “I see green”. “But this is a simple doubt about the <…> of a colour & it can be settled by asking someone what this colour (pointing) is called”. But are all such doubts removable by this question (or which comes to the same by giving a definition “I shall call this colour so & so”)?
“What colour do you see?”— “I don't know — is it red, or isn't it red; I don't know what colour it is I see.”— “ What do you mean? Is the colour constantly changing, or do do you see it so very <…> practically black?” Could I say then : “don't you see what you see ?” this obviously would make no sense.
Colour: black|red & white|blue <…>.
“What colour do you call: a, e, i, o or u?”— “I don't know which colour I see?”
“Primary colours are those used in flags”
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It is queer that one never uses brown on a flag & says it is a blend of yellow, black & red although nobody can really produce a proper brown by mixing these colours.
Is there a reason for not admitting brown as a primary colour?
Is it not enough that we <…> to group it with red, blue, green, etc.?
One sometimes thinks the reason is that we see transitions from brown to pure yellow, red, black; but so we do in the case of red etc.
Imagine all objects around us where <…>, I mean of the appearance of a white surface | paper or which the sun is shining, you would see the surface covered with tiny spots of red blue green yellow
Shall we say that a pointillist sees the objects as he paints them?
It seems as though, however the outward circumstances change, once the
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word is fastened to a particular personal experience, it now refrains it's meaning; and that therefore I can now use it with sense whatever may happen. To say that I can't doubt whether I see red is in a sense absurd as the game I play with the expression “I see red” doesn't contain a doubt of this form.
It seems,— whatever the circumstances I always know not whether to apply the word or not. It seems, at first it was a move in a special game, but then it becomes independent of this game.
(This reminds one of the way the idea of length seems to become emancipated from any particular method of meaning it.)
We are tempted to say: “damn it all, a rod has a particular length however I express it. And one could go on to say that if I see a rod I always see (know) how long it is although I can't say how many feet, meters etc. — But suppose I just say : I always know whether its <…> | it looks tiny or big!
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But can't the old game loose it's point when the circumstances change, so that the word | expression looses to have a meaning although of course I can still pronounce it.
He sticks to saying that he has been lying although none of the normal consequences follow. What is there left of the language game, except that he says the expression?
We learn the word ‘red’ under particular circumstances Certain object are usually red & keep their colour, most people agree with us in our colour judgements. Suppose all this changes : I see blood unaccountably sometimes one sometimes another colour & the people around me all make different statements. But couldn't I in all these cases retain the | my meaning of ‘red’, ‘blue’, etc. although I couldn't make myself understood to anyone?
Samples e.g. would all constantly change their colour — ‘or does it only seem so to me?’ “Now am I mad or have I really called this ‘red’ yesterday?”
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The situation in which we are inclined to say “I must have gone mad!”
“But we could always call a colour- impression ‘red’ & stick to this application!”
Die Atmosphäre die dieses Probleme umgibt ist schrecklich. Dichte Nebel der Sprache sind um den problematischen Punkt gelagert. Es ist bei nahe unmöglich zu ihm vorzubringen.
Suppose I had before me drawings of what I & other people now see & I said of the drawing of what I see “there is something unique about this picture”.
If I can speak about ‘what is seen’, why shouldn't anyone else speak about it?— But I have a feeling that only I can; if I assume that others also speak about what normally I should call my visual image there seems to me to be something
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wrong with this assumption.
If ‘what I see’ has nothing to do with a particular person why should I feel that there's something wrong in assuming that anybody might talk about it i.e. mean it when he speaks? Then of course I can't tell them what I see nor they me what they see any more than I can tell myself what I see.
But they could make <…> as to what might happen in future in our visual field.
In the normal game I say : “I don't know what they see, — but in the game I'm considering they would as much know what I see as my hand can write down what my mouth can say.
And their different conjecture would be like conjectures made by myself at different times.
Can my mouth tell my hand what I see in order that my hand should be able to write it down?
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Do I by painting what I see tell myself what I see?
“This picture is unique, for it represents what is really seen”.
What justification do I have to say this // What is my justification for saying this?//
I see two spots on this wall & lift two fingers. Do I tell myself that I see two spots? But on the other hand couldn't this be the sign for my seeing two spots?!
Ist das Bild ausgezeichnet oder zeichne ich es aus?
“Today he points to me, & yesterday he pointed to me also.”
The meaning of : “He points at me.
“I see that he points at A”
“I see that he points at me”
You seem to be able to give yourself a sort of ostensive explana
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tion of what the expression “What is seen” refers to.
Imagine a game: One person tells the other what he (the other) sees if he has guessed it rightly he is rewarded. If A hasn't guessed correctly what B sees B corrects him & says what it is he sees. This game is more instructive if we imagine the persons not to say what is seen but to paint it or to make models of it. — Now let me imagine that I am one of the players.
Wouldn't I be tempted to say : “The game is asymmetrical, for only what I say I see corresponds to a visual image.
The problem lies thus : This ↗) is what is seen; & this is also what I see.
Frage Dich : Kann das ↗) nur ich sehen, aber kann es auch ein Andres sehen?
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Warum nur ich?
Für mich existiert kein Unterschied zwischen ich & das↗; & das Wort “ich” ist für mich kein Signal, das einen Ort oder eine Person hervorhebt | bezeichnet| //eines Orts oder einer Person//.
Ich versuche das ganz Problem auf das <…> | nicht verstehen <…> der Funktion des Wortes ‘Ich’ & ‘↗’ zu reduzieren
When I stare | am at a coloured object & say “this is red” I seem to know exactly to what I give the name red. As it were to that which I am drinking in.
It is as though there was a magic power in the words “this is…”.
I can bring myself to say : There is no toothache there ↗ (in the man's cheek who says he has toothache ). And what would be the expression for this in ordinary language? Wouldn't it be my saying “I have no toothache there”?
“But who says this?”— “I!” And who says
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this?— “I!”---
Suppose I give this rule: “Whenever I said ‘I have toothache’, I shall from now on say ‘there is toothache’”.
I tell the waiter bring me always clear soup & thick soup to the others. He tries to remember my face.
Suppose I change my face (body) every day entirely, how is he to know which is me. But it's a question of the existence of the game. “If all chessmen were alike how should one know which is the king?”
Now it seems that, although he couldn't know which is me, I still could|would know it.
Suppose now I said : “it wasn't so & so, it was I asked for clear soup”, — couldn't I be wrong? Certainly. I.e. I may think that I asked him, but didn't. Now are there two mistakes I can make : one, thinking that I asked him, the other, thinking that I asked him? I say: “I remember having asked him you yesterday”, he replies: “You weren't there at all yesterday”. Now I could say either
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“Well then I suppose I remember wrongly” or: “I was here only I looked like him yesterday”.
It seems that I can trace my identity quite independent of the identity of my body. And the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something dwelling in a body the identity of my mind.
149003
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“If anybody asks me to describe what I see, I describe what's seen.”
What we call a description of my sense datum, of what's seen, independent of what is the case in the physical world, is still a description for the other person.
If I speak of a description of my sense datum I don't mean to give a particular person as it's possessor.
(No more do I want to speak about a particular person when I moan with pain.)
It must be a serious & deepseated disease of language (one might also say ‘of thought’) which makes me say : “Of course this ↗) is what's really seen”.
149004 149005 149006
149007 149008
“property of space”
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I can tell you the fact because I know that p is the case. It has sense to say “it rained & I knew it” but not “I had toothache & knew that I had. “I know that I have toothache” means nothing or the same as “I have toothache”.
This, however, is a remark about the use of the word “I”, whoever uses it.
k149001
Examine the proposition|sentence|statement :“There is something there”, referring to the visual sensation I am now having. Aren't we inclined to think that this is a statement making sense & being true? And on the other hand, isn't it a pseudo statement?
But what (what entity) do you mean (refer to), when you say that sentence?— Aren't we here up against the old difficulty that it seems to us that meaning something was a special state or activity of mind? For it is
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true that saying these words I am in a special state of mind, I stare at something, — but this just doesn't constitute meaning.
Compare with this such a statement as :“surely|of course I know what I am referring to by the word toothache”.
Think of the state|frame|mental state of mind in which you say to yourself that p∙~p must|does make sense & by repeating a statement of this form you are , as it were, by introspection trying to find out what it means.
The state|phenomenon of staring is closely bound up with the whole puzzle of solipsism.
“If I am asked ‘what do you see?’, I describe the visual world.” — Couldn't I say instead of this “…I am describing what's|what is there↗” (pointing before me)?
But now consider the case of someone having a picture before him of the part of his room he is seeing & that he's saying:“ this in the picture is like this (a part of his visual field, as he is looking at his room).”
Source: Notebook Ms-149, C5 (1935-36): This manuscript is a continuation of Ms-148 consisting mostly of notes for lectures on private experience and sense data. -- It is written in pencil in a softback notebook measuring 225 x 280 mm and containing 48 leaves with text on both sides. The language of the manuscript is English, with several paragraphs in German. The original is in the Wren Library, Trinity College Cambridge.
Author: Ludwig Wittgenstein
Editor: Alois Pichler
Organization: Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB)
2005-10))
Editor: Alois Pichler
Organization: Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB)
2005-10))
